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ABSTRACT 
Since its creation in 1949, the People’s Republic of China has had to deal with 
problems of ethnic conflict.  This is due to China’s large and diverse minority population, 
which accounts for approximately eight percent of the total population, or nearly 100 
million people.  From 1949 onward, the PRC has struggled to integrate these diverse 
people into a unified nation.  Throughout this period the relationship between the Chinese 
government and many of the country’s minorities has been fraught with conflict.  This 
thesis examines the role of the institutions used by Beijing to manage its relationship with 
minorities in China.  It includes a discussion of current theoretical research on ethnic 
conflict, a detailed explanation of the institutional approach to the study of ethnic 
conflict, and the application of this institutional approach to the Chinese case.  In 
applying the institutional framework to the PRC’s experience, this thesis examines the 
different ethnic conflict management strategies employed by Beijing from 1949 to 
present and evaluates the response of China’s minorities to each strategy.  Ultimately, 
this thesis concludes that the institutions used by the Chinese government since 1949 
have not been effective at mitigating ethnic conflict in China.  Additionally, this study 
demonstrates that an institutional approach is highly useful in understanding the causes of 
ethnic conflict in the Chinese case. 
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Since its creation in 1949, the People’s Republic of China has had to deal with 
problems of ethnic conflict.  This is due to China’s large and diverse minority population, 
which accounts for approximately eight percent of the total population, or nearly one 
hundred million people.1  This significant minority population is classified according to 
fifty-five distinct ethnicities, each of which has its own unique culture and history.  From 
1949 onward, the Chinese Communist Party has struggled to effectively integrate these 
diverse people into a unified nation.  Nevertheless, throughout this period the relationship 
between the Chinese government and many of the country’s minorities has been fraught 
with conflict.  Numerous incidents of ethnically motivated violence, from the 1959 revolt 
in Tibet to the 1997 uprisings in Xinjiang and beyond, mar the CCP’s record with 
China’s minorities. 
Institutional theories of ethnic conflict assert that the institutions employed by a 
government to manage its relationship with ethnic minorities significantly influence the 
nature and scope of ethnic conflict within a state.  Therefore, this study examines the role 
of the institutions used by Beijing to manage its relationship with minorities in China.  
This is accomplished through an investigation of the different ethnic conflict 
management strategies employed by the Chinese government from 1949 to present.  
Included is a discussion of the various institutional mechanisms used by Beijing as well 
as an appraisal of their impact upon China’s minorities. The relationship between the 
Chinese government and three of the country’s largest minority groups the Tibetans, 
Uyghurs, and Zhuang serves as the case studies for this analysis. 
                                                 
1 June Tuefel Dryer, China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition, 3rd ed  (USA: Addison 
Wesley Longman Inc, 2000), 277-280. 
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B IMPORTANCE  
The significance of this study lies in both its contribution to the study of 
state/minority relations as well as in its application to the Chinese case study.  From a 
theoretical perspective, this study sheds light on the complex relationship between the 
state and minority groups by examining how government institutions affect the formation 
of ethnic identity and influence the nature of ethnic conflict.  Through this approach, the 
different strategies for ethnic conflict management will be assessed and their 
consequences evaluated.  The purpose is to demonstrate the link between institutional 
mechanisms and the nature of ethnic conflict within states.  In its application to China 
this study is relevant because it shows how those institutions that have been used by 
Beijing have influenced the development ethnic conflict in China.  This is significant 
given China’s large minority population and the difficulties Beijing has experienced in 
dealing with these groups. 
The Chinese state has significant strategic and economic interests in the territories 
inhabited by the Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Zhuang, but these groups are culturally distinct 
from the Han Chinese and often times have more in common with China’s neighbors than 
the government in Beijing.  The result is a state with strongly vested interests in areas 
inhabited by people who do not identify with that state, creating the potential for ethnic 
conflict.  The inability of the PRC to effectively manage this conflict bears directly upon 
both China’s domestic stability and on the stability of the region as a whole.2  The 
significance of this research project therefore lies in enabling a better understanding of 
the relationship between the state and minorities in China and the role played by 
government institutions in intensifying or mitigating ethnic conflict. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study begins with a brief overview of contemporary research concerning the 
causes of ethnic conflict.  The purpose of this is two-fold.  One is to present the 
institutional approach to the study of ethnic conflict and explain why it has been chosen 
                                                 
2 Thomas Heberer, China and Its National Minorities: Autonomy or Assimilation?  (Armonk: ME 
Sharpe Inc., 1989), 3. 
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over other methods as the theoretical basis for this study.  The other is to introduce 
relevant terms and concepts prior to beginning any discussion of the Chinese case study.  
In attempting to understand the relationship between the state and its minorities it is 
important to examine the role played by the institutions which structure that relationship.  
Beverly Crawford defines such institutions as “sets of rules, compliance procedures, and 
[the] moral and ethical behavioral norms embedded in those rules and compliance 
procedures.”3  Such institutions create the framework within which the state and society 
interact by determining what is both possible and acceptable for each actor.  These 
institutions structure the incentives for compliance with the rules and procedures for 
participation in society.4  Therefore the strength of these institutions is linked directly to 
the stability of the state, as if such institutions are weak, the state will be incapable of 
ensuring compliance and will subsequently lose control over society. 
It is in this regard that political institutions become relevant in the study of 
minority groups and the conflicts they may have with the state.  Crawford argues that 
when these political institutions focus on ethnic classification, they legitimize it, and 
make it a relevant part of the political process.5  When ethnicity is included in political 
institutions it becomes a basis for inclusion or exclusion from politics and the distribution 
of resources.  The result is that such ascriptive institutions reinforce, intensify, or even 
create ethnic identities, as they are the means through which participation in society is 
predicated.6  This arrangement can engender resentment towards the state on the part of 
minorities because of a perceived or actual political and economic inequality. 
The subsequent conflict between the state and minority groups can either be 
channeled into effective political participation or repressed by a strong state.  The 
potential for ethnic conflict exists when state institutions recognize ethnicity, minority 
                                                 
3 Beverly Crawford, "The Causes of Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach," in The Myth of 
Ethnic Conflict: Politics, Economics, And "Cultural" Violence, ed. Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. 
Lipschutz (International Area Studies, 1999), 17. 
4 Shaheen Mozaffar, “The Institutional Logic of Ethnic Politics: A Prolegomenon,” in Ethnic Conflict 
and Democratization in Africa, ed Harvey Glickman (Atlanta: The African Studies Associated Press, 
2004), 44. 
5 Crawford, Causes of Cultural Conflict, 21. 
6 Mozaffar, Institutional Logic of Ethnic Politics, 46-47. 
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groups perceive themselves to be disadvantaged, and no effective means for 
reconciliation is built into the system.  The strength of these institutions are therefore 
important in two ways, one in that they determine how firmly ethnic classification is 
embedded in the political process and two they are the basis of the state’s ability to 
channel or repress conflict.  These factors combine to determine that nature and the 
intensity of ethnic conflict within a state. 
Alternative explanations to the institutional theories of ethnic conflict include 
primordialism and democratic/economic liberalization.  Primordialists argue that ethnic 
conflict is predicated on ancient hatreds that pre-date modern states.7  In the absence of a 
higher authority these ancient hatreds boil over, resulting in contemporary conflict.  This 
argument however does not explain the influence political institutions can have in 
cultural conflicts by creating rewards and punishments based on ethnicity.8  It also does 
not explain how state actions can actually create certain ethnic groups, a point which is 
made salient when discussing the case of Zhuang in China.  The Zhuang ethnic 
classification was created by the Chinese government in 1953 in order to organize and 
control the numerous tribes that inhabited China’s southern regions.9  Prior to this period 
these tribes did not identify with one another as a single group, but over time they have 
come to identify themselves as a cohesive ethnic identity.  The development of such a 
group cannot be accounted for within a primordial analytical framework. 
The second alternative explanation for ethnic conflict centers on democratization 
and economic liberalization.  This argument suggests that as politics and economics 
becomes liberalized, the focus of societal participation shifts from the ethnic group to the 
individual, whose rights are now protected under higher legal standards.10  This has the 
effect of reducing the strength of ethnic identity, and subsequently, ethnic conflict.  
However, the research of Beverly Crawford indicates that such liberalization more often 
                                                 
7 Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics” in New 
States, in Old Societies and New States, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: The Free Press, 1963), 106-107. 
8 Crawford, Causes of Cultural Conflict, 12. 
9 Katherine Palmer Kaup, Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2000), 4. 
10 Crawford, Causes of Cultural Conflict, 15. 
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brings increased disparity of wealth between minority groups and the majority within a 
state, actually strengthening ethnic identity and giving rise to more conflict.11  This point 
is also relevant to a discussion of ethnic conflict in China, where it appears that the 
current PRC policy is to focus upon economic development within minority regions in 
order to defuse ethnic discontent.  The data on economic development within China’s 
minority regions, however, suggest that the disparity in wealth continues to grow.12  The 
inability of both primordial and liberalization theories to adequately account for the trend 
seen in China’s relations with its minorities lends credence to the application of an 
institutional approach to the study of ethnic conflict in China. 
Having discussed the importance of institutions in the creation and maintenance 
of ethnic conflict, the question then becomes what role do institutional arrangements play 
in the creation, intensification, or mitigation of such conflict?  The research of Esman, 
Wolff, Schneckener, and Bercovitch suggests different strategies and institutional 
mechanisms that can be implemented in order to manage ethnic conflicts.  Two of these 
strategies are the depluralization of society and the legitimization of ethnic identity.13  
Depluralization of society is an attempt to achieve ethnic homogeneity within society.  
The mechanisms that can be employed to accomplish this include, genocide, expulsion, 
and assimilation, which may be forced or gradual.  Often times, however, rather than 
removing ethnicity from a state, this strategy foments ethnic identity as groups cling more 
tightly together to avoid their destruction at the hands of the state.  This breeds animosity 
towards the state and actually increases the chances of ethnic conflict.14 
Legitimization strategies recognize the distinctiveness of minority groups and 
attempt to explicitly include that in the political process. The mechanisms at work can 
include domination, power-sharing, and minority rights.  Domination entails the control 
of the state apparatus by a single ethnicity at the exclusion of other groups who are 
                                                 
11  Crawford, Causes of Cultural Conflict, 16. 
12 Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 112. 
13 Milton Esman, "Ethnic Pluralism: Strategies for Conflict Management" in Facing Ethnic Conflicts: 
Toward a New Realism, ed. Adreas Wimmer, Richard J. Goldstone, Donald L. Horowtiz, Ulrike Joras and 
Conrad Schetter (Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 204. 
14 Esman, Ethnic Pluralism, 205. 
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institutionally ordained to remain inferior.15  Power-sharing arrangements however, 
create a more equitable distribution of power between groups, where groups jointly 
administer a common polity.16  The differences between domination and power sharing 
can sometimes be subjective, as what may be labeled a power-sharing arrangement may 
in fact be a form of domination via co-opted rule or limited rule.17  This is the case when 
minority elites are allowed to participate politically in order to create the appearance of 
legitimacy, but do not provide any actual minority representation in government. 
Finally, minority rights create a system where minority groups are given special 
legal privileges and protections in order to make them feel secure within a state.  Power-
sharing or minority rights arrangements can be established via negotiation between the 
state and minorities or by third party mediation.18  An institutional perspective however, 
suggests that a legitimization of ethnicity strategy has serious consequences in that it 
overtly includes ethnicity into the political process.  As such, it creates the potential for 
minority groups to feel excluded from power on the basis of their ethnicity.  This will 
cause them to mobilize around their ethnicity and become more prone to engage in ethnic 
conflict with the state.19 
The examination of the PRC’s experience with its minorities contained in this 
study supports the above assertions made by institutional theorists such as Crawford and 
Esman.  In periods where the Chinese government employed a legitimization of ethnicity 
strategy and attempted to overtly include ethnicity in its politics, minority groups 
engaged in conflict with the state due to perceived inequality and mistreatment.  
Conversely, in periods where the Chinese government pursued a depluralization strategy 
and targeted minority groups for assimilation, these groups resisted the state by clinging 
                                                 
15  Esman, Ethnic Pluralism 206. 
16 Ulrich Schneckener, "Models of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: The Politics of Recognition" in 
Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa, and 
Asia, ed. Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 25. 
17 Ibid., 22. 
18 Jacob Bercovitch, "Managing Internationalized Ethnic Conflict," World Affairs 166, no. 1 (Summer 
2003): 56-68. 
19 Crawford, Causes of Cultural Conflict, 22-23. 
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even more tightly together to avoid their destruction.  This study seeks to demonstrate 
this through the following examination of the relationship between the Chinese 
government and the country’s minorities in the period between 1949 and present. 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This study applies the institutional approach to the Chinese case study by first 
dividing the time between 1949 and present into four periods based on the ethnic conflict 
management strategy pursued by Beijing during each period.  These periods are: the early 
communist period from 1949 to 1957, the time of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural 
Revolution from 1958 to 1976, the early reform period from 1977 to 1989, and finally the 
post-Tiananmen Square period from 1989 to present.   
Within each period a four-step process is used to break down and assess the role 
played by government institutions in influencing the development of ethnic conflict in 
China.  The first step of this process is an examination of the Chinese government’s 
intent with regards to the country’s minority population during each period.  This will 
entail a discussion of the historical domestic and international context that influenced the 
choice of ethnic conflict management strategy.  The question here is what did Chinese 
leaders want to accomplish in the relationship with China’s minorities through the use of 
the different ethnic conflict management strategies?  The second step involves an 
assessment of how the Chinese Communist Party attempted to achieve its objectives.  In 
short, what specific actions did the Party take in order to meet its objectives with regards 
to ethnic minorities?  The third part of this process is an analysis of the response of 
minority groups to the actions taken by of the state in each period.  Finally, an assessment 
is made of whether or not the minority response to the actions of the government was 
what Chinese leaders had intended.  This entails a comparison between the actual 
minority response, the government’s intended outcome, and the outcome predicted by the 
institutional theorists described above.  The focus here is in determining whether or not 
minorities responded as the way intended by the state and/or in the way predicted under 
the institutional theoretical framework? 
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Through this examination two important questions about the development of 
ethnic conflict within the PRC can be answered.  First, how effective have the strategies 
employed by the Chinese government been in mitigating ethnic conflict?  Second, how 
accurately does the institutional theoretical framework explain what has occurred in 
China?  If the institutional approach proves effective in explaining the development of 
ethnic conflict in the Chinese case, this then lends validity to its application to the study 
of other ethnic conflicts as well.  Additionally, through a better understanding of the 
institutional causes of ethnic conflict in China, interested governments parties may be 
able to create new or improve existing institutions in a way that better mitigates ethnic 
conflict than those institutions that have been employed in the past.  The application of 
this theoretical framework to other conflicts and recommendations on institutional 
remedies to China’s problems with ethnic conflict lay beyond the scope of this study, but 
provide relevant areas for future research. 
Three specific minority groups, the Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Zhuang, are examined 
in detail through the course of this study in order to avoid generalizations about minority 
group responses to state actions and to underscore the importance of how the unique 
historical experiences of each group has influenced their interaction with the state.  These 
three groups were selected because they are among the largest of China’s minority groups 
at six, eight, and sixteen million members respectively.20  They are territorially 
concentrated within China’s border regions and constitute a local majority inside their 
individual administrative units.  These groups have much more in common culturally 
with China’s neighbors, who have often assisted them in their attempts to resist the 
Chinese state.21  Finally, these groups have widely different historical and cultural 
experiences that have uniquely influenced their relationship with the state.  Therefore, by 
examining these three groups introduces a level of variation within the minority response.  
This allows for a more precise application of the institutional approach to ethnic conflict 
 
 
                                                 
20 Dreyer, China’s Political System, 277. 
21 S. Frederick Starr, Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland (Armonk: ME Sharpe Inc., 2004), 4-5. 
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in China, and help to avoid any conclusions that generically describe the responses of 
‘all’ Chinese minority groups to the different institutional mechanisms employed by the 
state. 
One final note on the minority groups selected for detailed discussion in this 
study.  There is a current debate among those who study China’s minorities concerning 
the status of the Zhuang.  Some scholars assert that this group is not distinct enough from 
the Han to be qualified for study as a minority group, while others assert that the actions 
of the Chinese state in promoting the Zhuang has caused this group to develop its own 
ethnic identity.22  As such, the Zhuang respond to the actions of the Chinese state in the 
same ways as other minority groups, and therefore should be accepted and studied as a 
distinct minority group.  This debate is relevant to an institutional assessment of ethnic 
conflict in China because it was through the institutional mechanisms employed by the 
Chinese state that the Zhuang ethnic group was created.  Therefore, this study attempts to 
shed light on the debate over the Zhuang’s minority status by comparing their response to 
the Chinese state to that of the Tibetans and Uyghurs.  If the Zhuang did respond in 
similar ways to the institutional mechanisms used by Beijing, this would lend credence to 
the argument that they should be considered a distinct minority group separate from the 
Han. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
During the early communist period, from 1949 to 1957, the CCP’s control over 
China was still weak, as it faced numerous domestic and international challenges to its 
legitimacy.  Several of those areas in which the Party’s sovereignty was most contested 
were the minority territories in China’s far west, Tibet and Xinjiang.23  These regions 
were home to the territorially concentrated minorities, the Tibetans and Uyghurs.  These 
groups constituted a local majority in their respective territories and so in order to control 
                                                 
22 Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 6-8. 
23 James A. Millward and Nabijan Tursun, "Political Histories and Strategies of Control, 1884-1978," 
in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), 85, and 
Warren W. Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations 
(Boulder: Westview Press Inc, 1996), 159. 
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China’s western borders the CCP had to deal with them.  Additionally, these groups had 
enjoyed periods of independence during the political instability that occurred in China 
after the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911.24  As such, the CCP adopted a legitimization 
of ethnicity strategy designed to encourage the Tibetans and Uyghurs to peacefully 
submit to Beijing’s control through promises of autonomy and self-determination.  This 
autonomy would essentially be the reward these minority groups received for their 
loyalty to the PRC and their support in strengthening China’s contested borders from 
foreign encroachment. 
This period also saw the creation of the Zhuang by the CCP as a way to overcome 
the difficulty in administering the diverse groups of people who inhabited Guangxi.  
These groups all demanded recognition as a minority so that they would be entitled to the 
privileged status as laid out under the legitimization of ethnicity strategy used by the CCP 
during this period.  Rather than attempt to deal with all of these groups individually, the 
Party encouraged them to merge together into one large group, which would then be 
entitled to the same level of minority rights awarded to the Tibetans and Uyghurs.25  This 
group ultimately became known as the Zhuang and in 1958 they received their own 
autonomous region to govern. 
It was through such autonomous zones that China’s territorially concentrated 
minorities were to exercise their right to self-determination.  Within these zones 
minorities would exercise political, economic, and cultural self-determination with 
minority leadership installed in local government posts.  The implementation of this 
strategy however, was flawed as the CCP used its position of ultimate authority within 
China’s governmental structure to subvert minority leaders in local office and maintain 
real political control in the autonomous regions.  This was accomplished through the 
manipulation of the PRC’s administrative units in ways that divided minority groups, 
forced them into competition with each other, and made it easier to exclude them from 
the political process.26 
                                                 
24 June Teufel Dreyer, China's Forty Millions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 128-135. 
25 Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 93. 
26 Smith, Tibetan Nation, 352. 
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Due to the way in which the CCP subverted minority autonomy, many minority 
groups quickly became disenfranchised with Party rule and began to resist the state.  In 
Tibet and Xinjiang, minorities formed grassroots organizations centered around religious 
figures from which to make demands on the state for genuine autonomy.27  In Guangxi 
the people resisted what they considered to be the arbitrary minority classification 
system, refusing to take on the newly created ethnic label of Zhuang.  This was not what 
the Chinese government had intended when it embarked upon a legitimization of 
ethnicity strategy.  It is however, the predicted minority group response under the 
institutional framework.  In legitimizing ethnicity, the Party created the political space for 
these groups to attribute any perceived inequality to ethnic discrimination, and as such, 
mobilize around ethnicity to resist the state.  One significant consequence of the CCP’s 
use of a legitimization strategy was the creation of ethnically based autonomous units.  
By creating such units, the CCP firmly embedded ethnicity into China’s political system 
and made it a relevant factor in the competition for power and the distribution of 
resources.  This defined the relationship between the state and minority groups strictly in 
terms of ethnicity and as such, it has proven to be lasting institutional source of ethnic 
conflict in China. 
During the time of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, from 
1958 to 1976, the CCP shifted to a depluralization of society strategy that attempted to 
assimilate minority groups into the Han majority in order to mitigate ethnic conflict 
within China.  This shift was undertaken for several reasons: one, it fit within the larger 
context of societal change occurring throughout all of China during this period; two, it 
brought Beijing increased control over China’s borders during a time of increased 
international hostility; and three, it was seen as a way to speed up the political integration 
of minority regions into the PRC.  As part of the Great Leap Forward all of China’s 
people were organized into large communes and subject to extensive state control of their 
daily lives.  In this regard, the collectivization and land reform seen in minority areas was 
not very different than what was experienced by all Chinese during this period.  One 
 
                                                 
27  Smith, Tibetan Nation, 373. 
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critical difference, however, was that in minority areas this land reform was viewed as 
being imposed by outsiders, which helped to reinforce the ethnic connotations of the 
conflict within these regions.28 
The shift in CCP policy to that of a depluralization strategy was also undertaken 
because the Party had become dissatisfied with the pace of the political and economic 
integration of minority regions into China.  CCP leadership asserted that minority elites 
were using cultural diversity as an excuse to stall the imposition of communism, which 
had threatened their position in traditional minority society.29  Communist leaders came 
to believe that the solution to these problems was to carry out an aggressive assimilation 
campaign in minority areas.  This campaign involved a two pronged approach to 
assimilation that included: the control of minority land through collectivization as well as 
substantial Han migration into minority regions; and the targeting of cultural diversity, 
such as religion and language, so as to remove any distinction between minority groups 
and the Han majority. 
In response to this many minority groups engaged in violent revolt against the 
Chinese state.  Such was the case in both Tibet and Xinjiang where the People’s 
Liberation Army had to undertake military campaigns in order to put down rebellion and 
restore Chinese rule.30  In a marked contrast to the experiences in Tibet and Xinjiang 
during this period, violence in Guangxi was largely neither of an ethnic nature nor 
directed at the government.  Instead villages that were often not only part of the same 
commune, but also of the same ethnic background, fought one another over access to 
resources.31  This suggests that violence seen in Guangxi was motivated by the shortages 
of food that plagued China after the failure of the Great Leap Forward.  The contrast 
between what was witnessed in Guangxi versus either Tibet or Xinjiang during this 
period is likely due to the role the Chinese state played in promoting the Zhuang during 
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the early communist period.  When the PRC removed this support during the time of the 
Great Leap and Cultural Revolution the people of Guangxi shifted the emphasis of their 
ethnic identity back to the clan/tribe level it had been at prior to the creation and 
imposition of the Zhuang ethnic label. 
The high level of ethnic conflict and violence seen among China’s minorities 
during this period was not what the Party had intended when it adopted a depluralization 
strategy.  Chinese leaders believed that through removing minority distinctiveness these 
groups would more easily become integrated into the Chinese state.  As the revolts and 
rebellions indicate however, what this strategy actually produced was more intense 
resistance to Chinese rule.  Such a response from minority groups is forecasted under the 
institutional theory of ethnic conflict.  Institutional theorists assert that when minorities 
are targeted by the state in the manner seen during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural 
Revolution, they will cling more tightly together in order to avoid their destruction.  The 
response of China’s minorities between 1958 and 1976 again validates the application of 
the institutional framework to the Chinese case. 
Following the radicalism of the Cultural Revolution, the PRC attempted to 
moderate its politics and focus upon a unified strategy for economic development.  In the 
third time period from 1977 to 1989, labeled the early reform period, Beijing shifted its 
minority policy back to a legitimization of ethnicity strategy.  This decision by the CCP 
was predicated on many of the same beliefs that had led to the use of a legitimization 
strategy during the early communist period, that if given a degree of autonomy, minority 
groups would peacefully submit to Chinese rule.  As part of this plan the CCP formally 
implemented a program of minority rights, enumerated in the PRC’s 1982 Constitution 
and the 1984 Law on National Regional Autonomy.  These laws provided China’s 
minorities with the broadest most well defined set of legal protections they had ever 
enjoyed, which included provisions against cultural and religious persecution.32  This 
approach combined with the end of communization formally ended many of the ways in 
which the PRC had attempted to assimilate minorities during earlier periods.  However, 
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the codification of minority status in Chinese law further embedded ethnicity into China’s 
political process.  As such, minority groups would come to use their new legal status as a 
means to resist the Chinese state and engage in continued ethnic conflict. 
Many of the same problems that hampered the PRC’s use of the legitimization of 
ethnicity strategy in the 1950s, remained in the 1980s.  For example, the CCP’s role as 
the true seat of power in China’s politics continued to be a contentious issue for 
minorities as they attempted to exercise the increased autonomy promised under the 1984 
law.33  Additionally, as part of the country’s economic reforms the government continued 
to promote large-scale Han migration into minority territories.34  Again, the promise of 
autonomy created an expectation of equitable treatment among minority groups that they 
did not feel was achieved in practice.  As such these groups organized politically in order 
to make demands on the state.  This was demonstrated by the proliferation of minority 
activists groups and their involvement in Chinese politics during this period. Therefore, 
much in the same way as seen during the early communist period, the use of a 
legitimization strategy did not produce the outcome intended by the CCP and instead 
confirms the predictions made by institutional theorists.  Legitimization of ethnicity 
provided these groups with the political space to make demands on the state and express 
their discontent with the Chinese government. 
The development of minority activist groups and their increased role in Chinese 
politics was a part of a larger movement within China to politically liberalize the country 
in the wake of economic liberalization.  This push for political liberalization came to be 
viewed by the CCP as a threat to its control of China.35  Therefore, the Party began to 
move away from pluralism and return to the more repressive practices of earlier periods.  
These tensions boiled over in the 1989 Tiananmen Square Crisis, in which government 
security forces brutally suppressed student protesters. 
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The time after the violence at Tiananmen Square to the present makes up the final 
period discussed in this study.  The application of the institutional framework and the 
four-step process in the post-1989 period is complicated by a disparity between China’s 
official minority policy and what has been observed in practice.  On the one hand, the 
legal protections granted to minorities during the 1980s remain firmly in place, implying 
that the intention of the Chinese government is to continue its strategy of legitimizing 
ethnicity.  On the other hand, it appears that the CCP has begun to use more repressive 
tactics to suppress minority discontent, which is reminiscent of the government’s policy 
during the Cultural Revolution.36  This contradiction makes it difficult to deduce the 
intent of and conflict management strategy in use by the Chinese government in the post-
1989 period.  This in turn complicates any attempt to measure the effectiveness of the 
CCP’s efforts to mitigate ethnic conflict and compare it with the predictions of the 
institutional framework as was done in the earlier periods. Therefore, this study will not 
draw any conclusions about the post-1989 period other than to point out that ethnic 
conflict in China appears to have escalated throughout the 1990s and into the 21 century.  
These issues are discussed more fully in the conclusion, but ultimately, further research 
into the relationship between minority groups and the Chinese government during this 
period is required before an institutional assessment as conducted in this study can be 
completed. 
F. SOURCES 
The sources that have been used for this study are largely secondary accounts of 
China’s history, the history of the individual minority groups, and the development of 
ethnic conflict within China.  Several primary documents have been used to augment the 
secondary accounts. One final note on the sources pertains specifically to the available 
research on the Zhuang minority group.  Currently Katherine Palmer Kaup, a professor of 
political science at Furman University, is one of a very small group of American scholars 
who have studied the Zhuang extensively.  With regards to the debate concerning the 
Zhuang’s status as a minority, Kaup argues that regardless of the group’s ethnic origin, 
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the actions of the Chinese state have caused the Zhuang to form a distinct identity and to 
behave in ways comparable to other Chinese minorities, such as the Tibetans and 
Uyghurs.37  One consequence of the Zhuang’s contested status is that the group has not 
been widely studied by English speaking scholars.  This has produced a scarcity of 
research on the Zhuang and their relationship with the state. 
It is for this reason that this study has had to rely so heavily upon the work by 
Kaup.  Scholars from disciplines such as linguistics and education have done some 
research on the Zhuang, focusing on the disparity between Han and minority group 
education levels in China.  These scholars have largely examined the way in which the 
Chinese government created a language for the Zhuang in the 1950s, but never officially 
used it or taught it in schools.  Where possible this research has been used to augment the 
work of Kaup and provide a greater diversity of sources concerning the Zhuang.  The 
debate over the Zhuang’s minority status, their ‘creation’ by the CCP, and subsequent 
relationship with the Chinese state offers a great deal of potential for future research by 
those scholars who examine minority groups and the development of ethnic conflict.  
This study will attempt to shed some light on this debate by comparing the responses of 
the Zhuang to the actions of the Chinese state to that of the Tibetans and Uyghurs. 
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II. THE EARLY COMMUNIST PERIOD:  1949-1957 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The early communist period was a tumultuous time for both the Chinese 
Communist Party and the country’s numerous ethnic minorities.  The defeat of the 
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) on the mainland, Chang Kei-Shek’s flight to Taiwan, 
and the involvement of super-powers within China’s domestic politics had important 
repercussions for Beijing’s minority policies between 1949 and 1957.  Ultimately, the 
domestic and international factors at play throughout this period lead Chinese leaders to 
adopt a legitimization of ethnicity strategy for managing the state’s relationship with 
minority groups.  The purpose of this strategy was two-fold.  First, was to bolster the 
domestic legitimacy of the CCP by rewarding minorities with self-determination for their 
loyalty to the Party, and second, because these groups mainly lived in China’s contested 
border regions their support would help to strengthen Beijing’s territorial sovereignty 
against possible KMT resurgence and foreign encroachment. 
In its attempts to legitimize ethnicity the CCP implemented minority rights 
policies based on territory.  This entailed the creation of autonomous zones where 
territorially concentrated minorities were to govern their own affairs and maintain a 
degree of political, economic, and cultural self-determination under Beijing’s 
supervision.  The use of these ethnically oriented autonomous zones had several 
important implications for the development of the CCP’s relationship with minority 
groups.  First, by creating ethnically based political units, the CCP embedded ethnicity 
into China’s political system in an overt and fixed manner that made it a relevant factor in 
the competition for power and resources.  Second by instituting a system that in 
appearance provided minorities with autonomy, the CCP created political space for these 
groups to feel disenfranchised if they did not receive that autonomy.  This in essence was 
what happened as the CCP often used its position in China’s political organization to 
subvert any attempts at self-determination in minority regions.  Since the relationship 
between these groups and the state became framed in terms of ethnicity, an expectation of 
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equitable treatment developed among China’s minorities during this period.  When this 
expectation was not met, minority groups increasingly began to resist the Chinese 
government. 
B. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
The creation of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949, symbolized 
the political victory of the Chinese Communist Party in its decades long struggle for 
control of the country.  Despite this victory however, the fledgling communist 
government faced numerous challenges at home and abroad.  One such challenge that had 
both domestic and international implications was the continued existence of the CCP’s 
chief rival and adversary during the Chinese Civil War, the KMT.  By 1934 the CCP had 
been beaten so badly by the KMT that the communist forces undertook a year long retreat 
termed the Long March, and took refuge in Yenan.38  The war with Japan however, 
undercut the power and legitimacy of the Nationalist Party.  Its inability to effectively 
resist the Japanese occupation, the economic dislocation brought by the war, and 
accusations of corruption severely crippled the organization’s ability to govern China.39 
This ultimately weakened the Nationalists to the point where the CCP was able to defeat 
them and seize control.  After his defeat in the Civil War, KMT leader Chiang Kei-Shek 
fled to the island of Taiwan and created a government in exile, which he proclaimed to be 
the rightful leadership of China.   
The emerging hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union that came 
to characterize the Cold War exacerbated this conflict between the Communists and 
Nationalists in China, with each superpower supporting its ideological ally.  U.S. support 
gave the KMT government on Taiwan a degree of strength and international legitimacy at 
a critical time when the CCP was unable to militarily capture the island.  The result was a 
diplomatic stalemate between the Communist government in Beijing and the Nationalist 
government in Taipei, which created a continuous opposition to the CCP’s authority.  
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Another problem posed by the Nationalists was that elements of the KMT military 
continued to operate in the north and southwestern portions of the Chinese mainland in 
Xinjiang and along the Sino-Cambodian, Burmese, and Vietnamese borders.40  So even 
after the establishment of a formal communist government in China, there continued to 
be domestic challenges to the CCP’s rule. 
Another factor that threatened the territorially sovereignty of the People’s 
Republic was the extensive foreign involvement in China’s border regions, the same 
regions that were inhabited by many of the country’s minorities, including the Tibetans, 
Uyghurs, and Zhuang.  Tibet for example, had experienced extensive British 
encroachment, including the Younghusband expedition in 1904 where the British military 
marched on the capital and forced trade relations on the Dalai Lama.41  England’s interest 
in Tibet continued until after World War II, as London sought to create a buffer between 
its holdings in India and perceived Russian/Soviet imperialism in Central Asia.  It was 
only after Britain had agreed to Indian independence that its interests in Tibet waned.42 
The United States, Britain, and India had all declined to internationally recognize Lhasa’s 
claims of independence, instead asserting that the Tibet question was internal Chinese 
matter.43  This decline of international interest coincided with the closing days of the 
Chinese Civil War, which created the opportunity for the CCP to militarily reclaim the 
region in 1950 after it had come to power the previous year. 
In Xinjiang, Uyghur dissatisfaction with the KMT had led to open rebellion and 
the creation of the Eastern Turkistan Republic (ETR), an autonomous region made up of 
the three northern districts of Xinjiang.  The ETR combatants were largely trained and 
equipped by the Soviet Union who had extensive economic and security interests in the 
region.44  Additionally, the Soviet Union assisted ETR leadership in the negotiation of a 
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ceasefire with the KMT government that allowed it to remain largely independent of 
Beijing between 1945 and 1949.45  The rise of a communist government in China 
however, brought an end to Moscow’s support of the Eastern Turkistan Republic and the 
region reverted to Chinese rule under the CCP following the establishment of the PRC in 
October 1949.46  The experience with independence in both Tibet and Xinjiang help to 
illustrate why the CCP pursued a legitimization of ethnicity strategy.  The Party needed 
to consolidate its control over these territories and the people who lived there, but 
because the Tibetans and Uyghurs had for a time enjoyed autonomy, a strategy that 
would encourage these groups to peacefully submit to Beijing’s control was required.  A 
legitimization of ethnicity strategy and the promise of territorially centered minority 
rights allowed Beijing to accomplish these objectives in Tibet and Xinjiang. 
In Guangxi there had been a long history of British and French intervention in the 
area during the Qing Dynasty, and while European colonialism in this area did not 
impede directly upon Chinese territorial sovereignty it did cleave off Burma and 
Indochina as tributaries to China.47  Additionally, China’s southwest was one of the last 
strongholds of the KMT on the mainland following its departure to Taiwan, making the 
CCP’s hold on the region tenuous in the early days of the People’s Republic.  The 
continued existence of the KMT, both on Taiwan and the mainland, as well as the history 
of foreign encroachment in many of China’s border regions, focused the CCP’s attention 
on solidifying its domestic legitimacy and guarding Chinese territorial sovereignty. 
C. EARLY CCP MINORITY POLICY IN THEORY 
It was from these concerns over domestic and international security that the 
CCP’s minority policy during the early communist period was born.  Many of China’s 
minorities live in the border regions where the CCP’s rule was the most contested and the 
country’s territorial integrity most threatened during this period.  As stated, KMT military 
forces remained active in both Xinjiang and Guangxi, home to the Uyghurs and Zhuang 
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respectively.  Additionally, in July 1949 the Tibetan government expelled all Chinese 
officials from its territory due to long-standing conflicts with the KMT and concerns over 
how a Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War would affect Tibet’s status.48 
Therefore, the CCP needed a minority policy that would solidify its control in these 
regions and prevent the further loss of Chinese territory following the events in Taiwan. 
One method by which the CCP could achieve these two objectives was to pursue 
a minority policy that distinguished it from the KMT.  Due to its western conception of 
nationalism, which emphasized allegiance to the state above all else, the KMT had 
pursued a minority policy that used a depluralization of ethnicity strategy through 
assimilation.49  This was because the KMT was unwilling to allow minority groups to 
maintain any identity that competed with the national identity they were attempting to 
build in China.  The result was widespread attempts to assimilate minority groups using 
educational programs such as Han language training and citizenship classes.  In many 
minority areas however, these actions by the KMT government provoked minority 
dissent and caused them to cling more tightly to their traditional customs.50  This led to 
an overall increase in the level of ethnic identity among China’s minorities as well as an 
increase in the level of conflict between these groups and the central government. 
Aware of the way in which KMT minority policy had alienated many groups and 
stirred resistance to Chinese rule, the CCP crafted a minority policy that emphasized 
legitimization of ethnic identity.  By recognizing ethnicity politically, the CCP hoped to 
win the favor of minority groups through the promise of protected legal status.  This set 
of minority rights would be territorially based, allow for political and economic self-
determination, and place minority leaders into local offices. Evidence of this was seen in 
Xinjiang, where after the Eastern Turkistan Republic was disestablished, many local 
leaders were promoted to positions of authority within the provincial government.51  
Additionally, the Party pursued what it called a ‘United Front’ in minority areas, a move 
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to create a more inclusive dialogue between the Chinese government and minority 
leaders.  United Front movements were seen in both Xinjiang and Tibet, where the CCP 
allowed non-Party organizations to remain in place as a sign of goodwill towards the 
existing minority leadership and to broaden the discussion concerning the political and 
economic integration of these regions into the PRC.52 
The CCP also allowed minority groups to retain a high degree of religious 
freedom, despite the overtly anti-religious tenants of Communism.  In Xinjiang, the CCP 
included Islamic leaders in governmental bodies such as the United Front, and allowed 
Islamic education to continue via the numerous mosques and madrasas located 
throughout the region.53  Support of the local Islamic elite was viewed as necessary by 
Beijing in order to reduce resistance to Chinese rule and curb the demands for the 
region’s secession.  Therefore, the Party permitted membership drives and the opening of 
new prayer halls of the Sufi branch of Islam, in both the urban and rural areas of Xinjiang 
during this period.54  Similarly, in Tibet this involved the inclusion of Buddhist leaders in 
governmental organizations as well as large-scale tolerance of Buddhism itself.  During 
the early Communist period the Party permitted the Buddhist monasteries to proceed with 
the many religious and secular functions that they preformed within Tibetan society.  
This included the hosting of extravagant festivals like the annual Monlam festival held in 
Lhasa.  The Party allowed the festival to proceed in 1951, despite concerns that such a 
large gathering of Tibetans could quickly turn anti-Chinese and result in massive 
demonstrations and violence.55  While there where some anti-government 
demonstrations, the festival remained largely peaceful, with the Party itself participating 
in some of the traditional practices of Tibetan Buddhism, including providing monetary 
gifts to monks.56 
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However, such religious tolerance and the inclusion of Tibetan leaders in 
governmental decision-making came on the heels of direct military conflict between 
Tibet and the PRC in 1950.  Tibet was a much more complicated region for the CCP to 
deal with given its claims of independence and the expulsion of Chinese officials in 1949. 
Beijing’s military effort to reclaim control of Tibet began in October 1950, but 
throughout the invasion the PRC continued to press Lhasa for a negotiated settlement 
between Tibet and China.  Feeling diplomatically isolated, Lhasa decided that its only 
option was to negotiate the best possible arrangement with Beijing.57  The result was the 
17-Point Agreement signed in May 1951 between the local government of Tibet and the 
CCP.  In the agreement Lhasa acknowledged that Tibet was part of China and that the 
Chinese government would handle all external relations for Tibet.  In return, the 17-Point 
Agreement promised the Tibetans cultural and religious freedom as well as political and 
economic self-determination.58  In this sense, despite the military invasion of Tibet, the 
CCP did make an attempt to win over the Tibetan people through a legitimization of 
ethnicity strategy using minority rights as laid out in the 17-Point Agreement. 
One major challenge to the CCP in enacting its strategy of legitimization was that 
it had to determine what groups were classified as ethnic minorities and would therefore 
qualify for an autonomous region and the associated minority rights.  In order to 
accomplish this they adopted the Stalinist Model for the definition of a nationality.  This 
model defined a nationality as a group that shared a common language, territory, 
economic life, and culture.59  It was by this measure that Moscow had established the 
Soviet Union’s minority groups and created the corresponding Soviet Republics.  The 
CCP used this standard to determine which groups were distinct minorities and therefore 
eligible for the political, economic, and cultural autonomy.60   
The adoption of the Stalinist Model for minority classification helped to put China 
on the path toward the use of ethnically oriented autonomous regions, similar to the 
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Soviet Republics.  The use of the Stalinist Model led to the identification of fifty-six 
separate nationalities including the Han majority.  Of those fifty-five nationalities 
considered minorities, the Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Zhuang are three of the largest. 
Additionally, these groups constituted a local majority due to high population 
concentrations in their particular territories.  Therefore, because of each group’s overall 
size and regional concentration the Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Zhuang were each given their 
own autonomous region to administer, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Guangxi, respectively.  The 
Chinese system differed from that of the Soviets in that the minority regions where not 
politically separate from the Chinese state, but instead autonomous under the over-
arching control of Beijing with minority officials allowed to govern at the local and 
regional levels.61  The adoption of the Stalinist Model and the creation of ethnically 
based political units within China effectively built ethnicity into the Chinese political 
system.  As such, ethnicity assumed political significance, incentivizing groups to 
politically mobilize and place demands on the state. 
One problem with the use of the Stalinist Model in China was that many minority 
groups did not fit the Stalinist definition of a nationality.  The Tibetans came the closest 
with a common language, territory, economic life, and culture.  Additionally, given 
Tibet’s experience with independence from the Chinese state, Tibetans had joined 
together as a single political unit, with a recognized political and spiritual leader in the 
Dalai Lama.  However, Tibet was and is a vast and sparsely populated territory where 
many different dialects are spoken and where many groups remained outside Lhasa’s 
control even during the territory’s independence.62   
The Uyghurs also did not fit completely into the Stalinist definition of a minority.  
While as a whole they shared a common religion and language, they were also widely 
dispersed across Xinjiang with many diverse economic and cultural backgrounds.  Some 
Uyghurs were farmers, while others where herdsmen, with each group having their own 
‘economic lives’ and associated cultural traditions.63  Additionally, while Xinjiang was 
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designated the Uyghur autonomous region, the area was and is home to many other 
minority groups such as Kazaks, and the Hui.  Each of these groups were further 
subdivided by religion, with some practicing Sunni, Shia, or Sufi Islam, and others 
different forms Buddhism.64  With so much diversity the majority Uyghur often 
competed amongst themselves as well as with other national minorities for local office in 
Xinjiang.  The same diversity that made the region difficult to administer for the CCP 
also complicated the situation of the local leaders, who had to contend with the Chinese 
government as well as one another for political control. 
Guangxi Province and the large number of disparate minority groups in the region 
provided the CCP with one of the largest challenges in implementing its minority policy.  
The region had been one of the last strongholds of KMT resistance, which required the 
CCP to use a military force to take the province in November 1949.  After it had defeated 
the Nationalists however, the CCP found itself faced with administering a region with 
over four hundred separate local minority groups, difficult terrain, and multiple language 
barriers.65  These groups did not share a common language, territory, economic life, or 
culture, and more importantly, they did not identify with one another as a single ethnic 
group, such as the Tibetans and Uyghurs did.   
Due to this, the CCP was not able to classify these people under the Stalinist 
Model, and yet each of these groups demanded recognition as a minority so that they 
could receive the protected status laid out under early communist minority policy.  In 
response, the CCP leadership crafted an inventive way to manage these groups.  Instead 
of attempting to govern all of them individually, the CCP encouraged them to merge 
together into one large group, with promises of minority status and consequently 
territorial autonomy.66  As part of this effort the Party used specially created ethnic 
survey teams made up of linguists and historians, as well as Communist officials, who 
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subsequently identified the Zhuang as a distinct ethnic category.67  Additionally, the 
Party established universities in Guangxi dedicated to the study of the Zhuang and 
specifically to the development of their written language, a process that was complete by 
1954.68  Through such informational campaigns and propaganda the CCP convinced the 
majority of these groups in Guangxi to band together and form the single ethnic group, 
the Zhuang.  In this sense the legitimization strategy used in the early communist period, 
the adoption of the Stalinist Model, and the CCP’s need to consolidate its power over the 
territory and people of Guangxi, came together to ‘create’ the Zhuang minority group.  
This provides a stunning example of how state institutions can help to create an ethnic 
identity where none had previously existed. 
By the end of the early communist period in 1958, the CCP had established the 
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region with sixty percent of the province’s population 
designated as members of the Zhuang minority.69  So despite the lack of a common 
language, territory, economic life, or culture the CCP had created a titular ethnic group, 
given it an autonomous region to govern, and made it similar promises of political and 
economic self-determination as those given to the Tibetans and Uyghurs.  The purpose of 
doing so was to consolidate the CCP’s control over the region, but by creating the 
Zhuang, the Party had set this group down a path that would lead to increased ethnic 
identity and subsequent demands on the state in future periods. 
D. EARLY CCP MINORITY POLICY IN PRACTICE 
The CCP minority policy during the early communist period had been developed 
in response to the domestic and international political factors present in China when the 
Party first came to power.  The history of foreign intervention and independence in 
minority regions, the virulent response of minorities to KMT attempts at assimilation, the 
continued existence of the KMT, and the adoption of the Stalinist Model for ethnic 
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identification, all came together to create a minority policy that legitimized the role of 
ethnicity in politics and promised protected legal status for minorities.  In Guangxi, the 
CCP adapted its minority policy to fit the local conditions in a way that created the 
Zhuang.  With each minority group the Party used a legitimization strategy that offered 
minorities a degree of autonomy in their political, economic, and cultural lives.  The 
purpose was to win over these groups by recognizing and protecting minorities in stark 
contrast to the attempts at assimilation by the KMT.  By gaining the support of the 
minorities in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Guangxi the CCP hoped to strengthen its domestic 
legitimacy and secure China’s borders against foreign encroachment. 
During the early Communist period however, the CCP often used subtle methods 
of social and economic control to maintain its dominance and impede minority self-
determination.  These methods included: the use of the Party’s unique position in the 
structure of the Chinese government to undermine minority autonomy; the organization 
of the country’s administrative units in ways disadvantageous to minorities; and the 
subversion of traditional leadership in minority communities.  While promising 
minorities protected legal status and autonomy within the system, the CCP often used the 
structure of the Party itself to sabotage minority autonomy.  Within China’s political 
system, the state government and the CCP exist as separate entities, but each state 
organization has a corresponding Party equivalent, with the Party component exercising 
ultimate authority.70  This arrangement allowed the CCP to appoint local minority leaders 
to state posts, but because these offices were subservient to their Party counterparts, they 
possessed no real power.  In this sense, the CCP’s legitimization strategy gave the 
appearance of safeguarding minority rights under the communist system, but the 
strategy’s implementation provided these groups with no real protection.  Additionally, 
the PRC’s 1954 Constitution did not include any mention of minorities or the special 
status that had been promised by the CCP, and without a legal foundation there was no 
way that minority rights could be realized.71 
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Another means by which the CCP was able to undermine minority autonomy was 
to organize the country’s administrative units in ways disadvantageous to minority 
groups.  For example, the Party organized the individual counties that made up the 
province of Xinjiang in a way that divided the Uyghur population between districts 
containing a majority of other nationalities.72  The purpose of this was to dilute Uyghur 
predominance within Xinjiang’s leadership by creating a system in which the Uyghurs 
had to compete directly with other minority groups for political office.  As a result, 
despite being a local majority within Xinjiang, the Uyghurs came to possess a 
disproportionately low number of local offices, only 40 percent of a potential 80 percent 
of such offices in 1951.73  So while the Uyghurs accepted CCP rule because minority 
leaders could hold office within Xinjiang, the system that the Party created locked them 
in competition with other groups.  This aided the CCP in its efforts to control Xinjiang by 
providing the appearance of autonomy, but simultaneously allowing the Party to remain 
dominant as minority groups struggled amongst themselves.74 
While promoting the Zhuang and encouraging the people of Guangxi to adopt the 
Zhuang ethnic identity, the CCP was simultaneously taking steps to undercut the 
influence and power of minority leaders within the region that were similar to those taken 
in Tibet and Xinjiang.  The CCP manipulated the size and shape of Guangxi’s 
administrative units in order to limit the involvement of minority leadership in local 
government.  This entailed the combination of the eastern and western portions of the 
region into a single administrative unit.  This was significant because the Zhuang 
population of Guangxi made up 67 percent of the total population in the western territory, 
but only 38 percent of the region as whole.75  So by combining the east and west into one 
administrative unit, labeled the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, the Party 
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significantly lowered the percentage of the total population made up by minority groups.  
This subsequently reduced the number of local offices reserved for minorities and aided 
the CCP in limiting the involvement of minority leaders within the region. 
Another way in which the CCP was able to mitigate the influence of Zhuang 
leadership was to manipulate the classification process in a way that promoted the 
Zhuang, while simultaneously preventing them from becoming an overwhelming 
majority within any single administrative unit.  Similar to the way in which this was 
carried out provincially, as discussed above in terms of the combination of eastern and 
western Guangxi into one unit, the Party would only classify certain portions of the 
population of particular counties as the Zhuang, while classifying other groups as Buyi or 
Dai, so that the Zhuang would not become an overwhelming majority in that county as 
well as have to compete with the other minorities for local office.76  Again, in the same 
way that administrative units were designed in Xinjiang to dilute Uyghur influence and 
force Uyghur leaders to compete with Kazaks and Hui for office, so to was Zhuang 
power diluted in Guangxi as Zhuang leaders competed with Yi and Dai for local control. 
The CCP further restricted the autonomy of minority groups by organizing 
Production and Construction Corps (PCCs), sometimes termed Bintugan State Farms in 
minority areas.  The PCCs resembled military organizations in their structure and were 
designed to carry out infrastructure construction and improvement projects in China’s 
remote minority territories.  The CCP used these groups to undermine minority autonomy 
by employing them as a tool to promote large scale Han migration into regions where 
national minorities were concentrated, such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Guangxi.  In 1952, 
the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps began an active recruitment campaign 
where it sent hundreds of cadres into eastern China to encourage Han migration into 
Xinjiang.  As a result, by 1954 the Xinjiang PCC had grown to almost 300,000 settlers, of 
which 90 percent were Han.77  The Production and Construction Corps engaged in 
numerous infrastructure improvement projects in China’s western regions, but largely 
employed only the Han migrants and demobilized PLA soldiers.  These biased 
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employment practices brought disproportionate economic development to the Han 
enclaves that developed around the PCCs, which in turn fueled minority claims of unfair 
treatment by the Chinese state. 
In addition to the introduction of Production and Construction Corps, the CCP 
used other administrative and organizational methods to control the population of Tibet.  
For example, the Chinese government divided what the Tibetans considered their 
historical homeland between the Xizang Tibetan Autonomous Region (the official 
Chinese administrative name for Tibet) and the neighboring provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, 
Sichuan, and Yunnan.  This was done for the same purpose as the gerrymandering of the 
counties in Xinjiang, to divide the numerically superior ethnic minority across a large 
number of differing administrative units.  By dividing Tibet in this manner the CCP 
removed a large portion of the Tibetan population from direct control of the Dalai Lama’s 
government in Lhasa and placed it under standard Chinese provincial control.78  Under 
this plan only those Tibetans that resided in central Tibet, now labeled the Xizang 
Tibetan Autonomous Region (XTAR), would constitute a regional majority and qualify 
for minority rights as laid out under the 17-Point Agreement.  Those Tibetans that lived 
in the eastern portion of historical Tibet then became residents of normal Chinese 
provinces and therefore were not entitled to the same level of minority rights as the 
Tibetans who lived in the XTAR.  As in Xinjiang with the Uyghurs, this situation made it 
difficult for Tibetans outside of central Tibet to effectively participate in government, 
which was the intended result when the CCP carried out the division of Tibet in this 
manner.79 
In order to limit the ability of Tibetans to exercise autonomy within central Tibet, 
or the XTAR, the Party fostered competition among the political factions of the Dalai 
Lama’s government.  The structure of Tibet’s theocratic and secular governments 
facilitated the CCP’s ability to divide and conquer.  The Dalai Lama, as the spiritual and 
political leader of Tibet, maintained his government in Lhasa, while the secular 
government maintained its headquarters in Chamdo.  Additionally, the Panchen Lama, 
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the second highest ranking Tibetan leader after the Dalai Lama maintained a third 
government in Shigatse and often disagreed with both those in Lhasa and Chamdo over 
how to deal with the Chinese.  The CCP exploited these divisions within Tibet’s 
leadership by negotiating with all three factions, playing one off against the other in order 
to reduce resistance to Chinese rule.80  This combined with state/Party arrangement that 
kept real authority in the hands of the CCP greatly reduced Tibetan autonomy. 
One final method that the CCP used to subvert the autonomy of minority groups 
was through land reform and cadre recruitment policies that undermined the power of 
traditional elites in minority societies.  In Xinjiang the Party used land reform as a way to 
seize the holdings of powerful Islamic clerics.  It was through these lands that the clerics 
raised revenue, via rent and taxes, which they then used to fund charities and public 
works projects.81  Without their land, the clerics were unable to fund such efforts that 
were the basis of their status within Xinjiang’s Muslim community.  These efforts by the 
CCP to undermine traditional elites was undertaken in Tibet as well, where the 
landholdings of powerful monasteries were seized for same purpose of depriving the 
traditional elite of their privileged place in Tibetan society.82 
In Tibet the PRC also undermined the role of traditional elites by attacking 
serfdom, which was sanctioned by the Dalai Lama’s Buddhist government and practiced 
extensively throughout the region.  The CCP argued that the practice of serfdom 
amounted to slavery and it was therefore the duty of the Party to bring democratic 
reforms to Tibet in order to liberate the abused peasantry from the regions feudalist 
elite.83  As such, the Party recruited heavily from Tibet’s lower classes, placing them 
supervisory positions over their former landlords.84  This elevation in status was 
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accompanied by the redistribution of land as discussed above, which taken together was 
highly disruptive to Tibet’s traditional society, but proved partially successful at winning 
the Chinese government support among the Tibetan peasantry. 
The decision by Communist leaders to create the Zhuang out of the region’s 
diverse peoples left the Party with a unique problem in Guangxi.  One the one hand they 
had to actively promote Zhuang ethnicity and encourage the locals to adopt that identity.  
On the other hand they had to prevent local minority leaders from becoming too powerful 
and exerting too much influence in regional decision-making.  The result was an odd mix 
of active Zhuang recruitment combined with the same methods used to maintain control 
over the Tibetans and Uyghurs.  As part of its plan to promote the group, the CCP created 
a number of organizations designed to study the Zhuang and advance them culturally.  
One such organization was the Guangxi Nationalities Institute, the purpose of which was 
to train minority cadres, coordinate minority research, and translate books into minority 
languages.85  The equal emphasis placed upon Communism and the promotion of 
ethnicity within the Institute’s mission, helps to demonstrate the importance the Party 
placed on the successful adoption of the Zhuang ethnic identity by the people of Guangxi. 
Another way in which the CCP was able to promote the Zhuang was to simply 
force the label upon otherwise unwilling residents of Guangxi.  In doing this, the Party 
would often lump the diverse people of one town or another into the category of Zhuang 
and explain to these people that they misunderstood the government’s classification 
system.86  Following such moves the people could either accept the Zhuang classification 
and elect local leaders on that basis or reject it, only to have a Han CCP member 
appointed to local office, who would then treat them as Zhuang anyway.  In this regard, 
the CCP used its administrative powers to coerce the people of Guangxi to accept the 
Zhuang ethnic identity, as it was only through such acceptance that they could participate 
politically or enjoy other services, such as access to educational institutions like the 
Guangxi Nationalities Institute discussed above. 
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E. MINORITY GROUP RESPONSE 
Many Tibetans and Uyghurs were disgruntled at the loss of independence that 
accompanied integration into the Chinese state.  The Tibetan response to Chinese rule can 
be evaluated in two ways, from the perspective of the region’s traditional elites and from 
that of the masses.  With regards to Tibet’s traditional elites, feudal landowners and 
Buddhist monks, the Party initially provided these groups with stipends and honorific 
titles when they first moved into the region in 1950.87  The purpose of this was to co-opt 
these leaders and pacify them as the Party increased its control over Tibet.  However, as 
the Party carried out land reform and recruited the local peasantry into cadres, the power 
base of these elites was eroded, leading them to become increasingly dissatisfied with the 
CCP.  As such, many began to agitate against the Chinese government, forming anti-
Chinese groups throughout central Tibet.88  Eventually, these groups would become so 
frustrated at the Chinese presence in Tibet that they would take up arms and engage in 
open rebellion.   
Throughout much of the early communist period it appears that the Dalai Lama 
made a good faith effort to cooperate with Beijing and negotiate an equitable agreement 
between Tibet and the Chinese government.  This is reflected in Tibetan acceptance of 
the 17-Point Agreement as well as the Dalai Lama’s meetings with top Communist 
leaders, Mao Zedong and Chou Enlai.89  In 1954 he traveled to Beijing for the Chinese 
National People’s Congress where the PRC’s constitution was to be formally approved.  
The Dalai Lama remained in Beijing for almost a year and met with Mao Zedong often 
and was elected the Vice-Chairman of the NPC’s Standing Committee.90  The breakdown 
of the Dalai Lama’s efforts to cooperate with Chinese government and his flight to India 
precipitated the rebellion led by Tibetan elites and will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Three. 
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The resistance against CCP rule within the Tibetan masses took the form of 
grassroots organizations that focused on the immediate needs of the community.  For 
example, a group known as the People’s Assembly formed in Lhasa and actively 
protested the presence of the PLA in the city.91  They argued that the large number of 
PLA soldiers in Tibet was causing inflation and food shortages.  However, the People’s 
Assembly was poorly organized and had no unified leadership, so it proved ineffective at 
petitioning the Chinese government for change.92  The Chinese government proceeded to 
label the group as unlawful and threatened to arrest anyone who repeated their actions.93 
The resistance to Chinese rule in Xinjiang during the early communist period was 
similar to that of the People’s Assembly in Tibet, organized at the grassroots level with 
an emphasis on Islam.  Having undermined the power of many Sunni and Shiite clerics 
through land reform, as discussed earlier, many Muslims in Xinjiang turned towards 
Sufism.  Different from Sunni and Shia Islam, Sufism deemphasizes the importance of 
Mosques and land and instead focuses on the importance of Muslim fellowship.94  As 
such, under Sufism Muslims can meet practically anywhere to discuss their faith and 
listen to religious teachings.  Therefore, by practicing Sufism the Uyghurs were able to 
maintain their Islamic faith despite attempts by the Chinese state to undermine it. 
Aside from the role that local Muslim clerics played in resisting Chinese attempts 
to weaken Islam, no unified anti-Chinese movement emerged in Xinjiang during this 
period.  This may have been due to the diverse and dispersed nature of the regions 
population as well as the large PLA presence within the region.  As discussed the 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps brought in literally hundreds of thousands of 
Han Chinese into the area, many of whom were demobilized soldiers.  Additionally, 
pressure from Moscow on the leaders of the former Eastern Turkistan Republic to 
cooperate with the CCP removed the support that had allowed the Uyghurs to resist the 
KMT government prior to 1949.  Therefore, many Uyghur leaders cooperated with the 
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CCP during the early communist period at the direction of Moscow.  On such Uyghur 
leader was leader, Saifudin, who had been trained in the Soviet Union, was a member of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and was instrumental in the revolt against the 
KMT that led to the creation of the Eastern Turkistan Republic in 1944.95  Already 
trained in the tenants of Communism, Saifudin began to work with Chinese communists 
in 1950 to help integrate Xinjiang into the PRC.  Consequently, the CCP awarded 
Saifudin with important posts in the Party and in the government of Xinjiang, which 
helped to reduce Uyghur resistance to Chinese rule.96 
Due to the lack of any common bonds or group identity across Guangxi, 
resistance to the Chinese government during the early communist period was not unified 
and occurred sporadically at the local level.  Much of this resistance was due to the ethnic 
classification system imposed by Beijing on the region in its efforts to create the Zhuang.  
Many of the people of Guangxi did not identify themselves as Zhuang and therefore 
refused to accept such classification.  As discussed however, the Party used its 
administrative powers to coerce people into accepting the Zhuang ethnic identity by 
refusing access to government resources to those who did not.  Residents of Guangxi also 
protested the arbitrary manner in which classification was carried out, as often times 
members of the same tribe or even family would be classified as different minority 
groups.97  This was done as part of the Party’s effort to prevent any single minority in 
Xinjiang from becoming an overwhelming local majority that would subsequently bring 
increased representation and control over the region’s government. 
F. ASSESSMENT 
The response of the Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Zhuang to the CCP’s minority policy 
during the early communist period was largely influenced by the experiences of each 
group in earlier times.  The exposure to independence for the Tibetans and Uyghurs 
influenced not only the way the CCP treated these groups, but the way in which they 
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responded to the Party.  Beijing understood that these two groups had governed their 
territories as independent entities and as such, had to recognize that in order to peacefully 
bring the Tibetans and Uyghurs back into the Chinese fold.  On the part of the minority 
groups, the lack of international support forced them to concede to Chinese rule.  The 
result was a minority policy in which the state offered to recognize the ethnicity of these 
groups and provide them with a degree of territorially based autonomy in return for their 
loyalty to Beijing.  The groups accepted this and allowed the CCP to consolidate its 
control over the people and territory of Tibet and Xinjiang. 
In Guangxi, the large number of diverse minority groups presented the CCP with 
serious administrative problems, which they overcame by coercing those groups into 
forming one large group, the Zhuang.  The people of Guangxi allowed this to happen in 
order to reap the benefits of territorially autonomy that would come with recognition as a 
minority group within the Chinese state.  So in each case, the minority groups accepted 
the rule of the Party and permitted Beijing to consolidate its control over their territory.  
However, there are two critical issues that must be addressed in this assessment.  One is 
that this acceptance of the CCP was predicated on promises of political, economic, and 
cultural self-determination.  In short, minority support for the CCP was conditional on 
autonomy.  The fact that this autonomy was never formalized legally or adequately 
implemented in practice, created the potential for minority discontent and conflict with 
the state that was realized in later periods.  In this sense, the legitimization strategy 
pursued by the CCP was not successful.  It did win the Party the support of minorities, 
but it did so by creating an expectation of equal treatment that was never achieved. 
Second, the use of the ethnically based political units explicitly incorporated 
ethnicity into the Chinese political system.  The classification of national minorities and 
the subsequent creation of autonomous regions based on ethnicity formally 
institutionalized ethnicity as a relevant component of Chinese politics.  By framing 
political competition in terms of ethnicity, the CCP inadvertently strengthened the ethnic 
identity of these groups because this came to be the way in which their relationship with 
the state was defined.  So while the CCP intended its legitimization strategy to result in 
the peaceful acceptance of Chinese rule by China’s minority groups, it actually helped to 
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lay the foundation for increased ethnic conflict in subsequent periods.  Rather than 
decrease the importance of ethnicity in politics, the legitimization strategy pursued by the 
CCP strengthened the importance of ethnicity in politics and gave minorities the 
opportunity to use it as tool to make demands on the state.  When these demands were not 
met, these groups increasingly resisted the Chinese state. 
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III. THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD AND CULTURAL 
REVOLUTION:  1958-1976 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution the Chinese 
government’s policies towards minorities shifted dramatically.  International hostility and 
isolation forced China down a path toward economic ruin and political instability that 
persisted all the way into the 1970s.  The Great Leap Forward brought on massive 
societal change and disruption that required the Chinese government to abandon the 
legitimization of ethnicity strategy it had pursued during the early communist period.  
Instead, in its attempts to exert greater control over Chinese society, the CCP employed a 
depluralization of society strategy that targeted minority groups for assimilation into the 
Han majority. The shift in CCP strategy to assimilatory practices was undertaken for 
several reasons: because it fit within the larger context of the societal change that was 
occurring throughout China during the Leap and Cultural Revolution, it brought the CCP 
greater control over the country’s borderlands during a time of heightened hostility with 
China’s neighbors, and it was seen as a remedy for the slow pace of socialist reform in 
minority regions.  However, the result was to largely produce violent ethnic conflict 
throughout minority regions during this period.  The inclusion of ethnicity in the PRC’s 
political organization that had occurred during the early communist period facilitated the 
politicization of ethnicity.  The subsequent attempts by the CCP to assimilate these 
groups led them to cling more tightly together and violently resist the state’s attempts at 
assimilation during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. 
B. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
In March of 1959 amid a growing storm of unrest in Tibet, the Dalai Lama fled 
Lhasa and took exile in India.  Subsequently, the region exploded as Tibetans all across 
China’s western territory took up arms against the state.  At its height, the Tibetan 
resistance had over 5,000 guerilla troops operating from Tibet’s southern region, who 
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where covertly supplied by the American Central Intelligence Agency.98  The roots of 
this rebellion went all the way back to Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950 and subsequent 
division of historical Tibet between the Xizang Tibetan Autonomous Region and the 
provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan.  In dividing Tibet in this manner the 
CCP was able to restrict the terms of the 17-Point Agreement and the secular position of 
the Dalai Lama’s government to only the Xizang Tibetan Autonomous Region.  As such, 
those Tibetans who resided outside the autonomous zone were not guaranteed the same 
level of minority rights and where largely excluded from local government.  This angered 
many of the region’s traditional elite, whose power was further undercut by land reform 
and collectivization.  Additionally, as the poor economic policies of the Great Leap 
Forward began to produce food shortages anti-Chinese sentiment was roused among the 
Tibetan masses.  As disenfranchised Tibetans in the east began to clash with Chinese 
security forces, many fled west into the Xizang Tibetan Autonomous Region, 
concentrating around Lhasa.   
Even without the influx of refugees from eastern Tibet, tensions were heightened 
within the autonomous zone for many of the same reasons.  Collectivization had upset the 
region’s traditional society and as China progressed deeper into the Great Leap Forward 
attacks on Tibetan culture and religion were also increased.  The Dalai Lama attempted to 
keep the peace as he had promised to cooperate with the Chinese government and 
facilitate Tibet’s integration into China.  However, as the situation deteriorated and 
suspicion mounted, the Dalai Lama decided to flee out fear that the Chinese government 
intended to kidnap and remove him from Tibet.  The reports of the Chinese intention to 
kidnap the Dalai Lama and his flight served as the catalyst that sparked open fighting 
between the Tibetan resistance and the Chinese. The rebels proved to be poorly trained, 
equipped, and organized, and within several weeks the PLA was able to put down the 
revolt.  The CCP subsequently dismantled the Tibetan government and stepped up those 
very programs that had motivated the resistance in the first place. 
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The role of the United States and the support it provided to the Tibetan rebels is 
an important factor in understanding Chinese history and the relationship between the 
government and minority groups during this period.  The assistance offered to Tibet by 
Washington was a small part of a larger objective in American politics to weaken and 
harass the communist government of China during the Cold War.  The development of 
the Cold War throughout the 1950s and Beijing’s role in the Korean War had led the 
United States to target the PRC and attempt to politically and economically isolate 
communist China from the rest of the world.  As such, Washington formally recognized 
Chiang Kei-Shek’s regime on Taiwan as the legitimate Chinese government and signed a 
mutual defense fact with Taipei in 1954.99  Additionally, the United States worked to 
deny the PRC reconstruction loans from the World Bank and prevented its admission 
United Nations.100  It was also during this period that Washington became increasingly 
involved in Vietnam, bringing the super-power to China’s doorstep in the south. 
The high level of U.S. involvement along China’s periphery, the challenge that 
Washington’s support of Taipei presented to the PRC’s legitimacy, and the international 
animosity and exclusion directed at Beijing left it sorely in need of allies.  As such, the 
Chinese Communists turned to their ideological brethren in Moscow for support.  The 
alignment between Moscow and Beijing culminated in the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, 
and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1950.  As a part of this alliance the Soviet Union 
provided the PRC with much needed financial assistance in the form of loans as well as 
technical experts to assist China in its industrialization and military modernization.101  In 
return the Soviet Union maintained access to important strategic and economic resources 
in China, specifically in Manchuria and Xinjiang.102  In Manchuria this included 
privileges like the continued use of Port Arthur and Darien for Soviet warships and 
merchants, while in Xinjiang this meant sustained access to the region’s natural resources 
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including oil and precious metals.103  The concessions in Xinjiang were similar to those 
that the Soviet Union received in return for its support of the Eastern Turkistan Republic 
prior to 1949 and helps to explain Moscow’s persistent interest in the region even after 
the rise of a friendly communist government in China. 
For China the Sino-Soviet Alliance also helped to bolster the country’s 
deteriorating security situation in a period of growing Western hostility as well as 
provided Beijing with its only avenue towards some degree of international legitimacy 
and economic support.  As early as 1954, however, relations between Moscow and 
Beijing became strained.104  Disagreements over the basic principles of communist 
ideology combined with more concrete economic disputes to fuel a growing rift between 
the PRC and USSR.  Ideologically, the death of Stalin and Khrushchev’s subsequent de-
Stalinization campaign caused severe problems for Mao.  At the Twentieth Congress of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s cult of 
personality and criticized many of his actions and beliefs.  Mao, who himself practiced a 
cult of personality, believed that he and not Khrushchev was the true standard-bearer for 
the international Communist movement and therefore became less inclined to cooperate 
with the Soviet leader.105 
Economically, Moscow had objected strongly to Beijing’s decision to embark 
upon the Great Leap Forward, and when the CCP went ahead with the Leap, Khrushchev 
responded by recalling his advisors and canceling Soviet aid to the PRC.106  As the Sino-
Soviet rift deepened, Xinjiang became a fault line as both countries considered the region 
economically and strategically significant.  Moscow wanted to maintain its exclusive 
access to the region’s natural resources, while Beijing considered the Soviet concessions 
in Xinjiang unfair and therefore sought to end them.107  Between 1959 and 1962 
collectivization, food shortages, and the suppression of Islam led thousands of Xinjiang’s 
                                                 
103 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 255. 
104 Hsu, Modern China, 678. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Jian, Mao’s China, 78-82. 
107 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 255. 
 43
minority residents to flee the region, taking refuge inside the Soviet Union.  Moscow 
welcomed the refugees as Beijing attempted to exert stricter control over the border.108  
The conflict came to a head in May of 1962 when the CCP formally closed the Sino-
Soviet border, prompting a riot among minorities in the town of Yili.  The PLA was able 
to put down the riot and seal the border, but by that point over 60,000 minority residents 
of Xinjiang had already relocated to the Soviet Union.109 
During the same period that China’s relations deteriorated with the Soviet Union, 
its relationship with India broke down as well.  During the early years of the Cold War 
India had become a prominent member of the Non-Aligned movement, joining with 
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union as each sought to increase its influence 
around the world.  As part of this New Delhi maintained positive relations with Beijing 
and agreed to respect China’s borders.110  This decision was partially motivated by 
problems in India’s border regions similar to those in China, where pro-independence 
minority groups were making administration by the central government difficult.111  By 
1962 however, long-standing border disputes between India and China erupted into open 
conflict in which the PLA soundly defeated India forces.112  This problem was 
exacerbated by the conflict in Tibet, as the 1959 revolt produced a large number of 
Tibetan refugees who fled with the Dalai Lama into India.  One indication of how much 
Sino-Soviet relations had deteriorated was that in this border conflict between China and 
India, Moscow had supported New Delhi over Beijing.113 
Confrontation with the United States and growing hostility with its neighbors led 
Beijing to feel surrounded and isolated from the international system.  As a result, 
China’s politics became more radicalized throughout this period as the Party attempted to 
exert greater and greater control over all aspects of Chinese society.  This began with the 
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implementation of the Great Leap Forward in 1958, which was envisioned as a way for 
China to become self-sufficient through rapid industrialization.  In order to do this, the 
Great Leap called for the total collectivization of China’s agriculture, so that agricultural 
surplus could be quickly drawn off and pumped into industrial expansion.114  To 
accomplish this collectivization the CCP undertook a massive land reform campaign 
where private holdings were seized and converted into communes.  The communes then 
became the center of existence for the Chinese populace as it was only through the state 
controlled communes that people could obtain the essentials for survival, such as food, 
shelter, and healthcare.  The Party enforced this collectivization through a strict 
population registration policy that denied families access to government services 
anywhere other than their assigned commune.  This prevented large-scale migration as 
the CCP could ensure that people would not be able to eat or find housing if they 
attempted to leave their commune. 
While such a high level of collectivization gave Beijing the ability control society 
and resources, the Leap itself was fundamentally flawed as it was not an effective method 
for agricultural production.115  This produced a massive famine that lasted into 1962 and 
resulted in an estimated 25-30 million deaths in China.116 The failure of the Leap and the 
related political upheaval was enough to create a temporary period of retrenchment in 
which reform-minded leadership took control of the CCP. 
After several years of moderation the Party again began to pursue more 
radicalized policies and renew China’s communist revolution in what came to be known 
as the Cultural Revolution.117  In the turmoil that ensued, many senior CCP leaders were 
purged as the Red Guards, young members of the Party who where enamored with Mao, 
attacked the ‘old’ customs and habits of their predecessors.118  The radicalism of the 
Cultural Revolution began to taper when Mao himself became dissatisfied at the way in 
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which the Red Guard movement had grown violently out of control.  This repudiation of 
the Red Guards and Mao’s death in 1976 was finally enough to conclusively end the 
Cultural Revolution.  Ultimately, the Cultural Revolution led to a decade of political and 
civil strife that further exacerbated the negative impacts of the Great Leap.  With much of 
its leadership purged, the Party itself was barely able to govern the country and the 
economy ground nearly to a halt.119 
C. CCP MINORITY POLICY DURING THE GREAT LEAP AND 
CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
During the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the CCP pursued a 
depluralization of society strategy in which it attempted to assimilate minority groups 
into the Han majority.  The Party shifted its strategy during this period for several 
reasons.  The new approach fit within the context of the societal change that was 
occurring throughout China during the Leap and Cultural Revolution, it brought the CCP 
greater control over the country’s borderlands during a time of heightened hostility with 
China’s neighbors, and it was seen as a remedy for the slow pace of socialist reform in 
minority regions.  A depluralization of ethnicity strategy, and the attempts to assimilate 
minority groups, fit within the larger trends of the Great Leap Forward, as all of China’s 
peasants and workers were organized into communes and subject to extensive state 
control of their daily lives.  In this sense, the collectivization of minority agriculture was 
no different than what was experienced by Han peasants throughout the rest China. 
However, this communization proved to be difficult for minority groups as often 
times, their means of subsistence also contained important cultural relevance.  For 
example, Uyghur herdsman in Xinjiang watched as ever-growing state farms consumed 
their pastures.  Under the Leap, up to 72 percent of these herdsmen were forced to 
abandon their nomadic lifestyle and join the communes.120  Additionally, in Tibet and 
Xinjiang the power of traditional elites was largely rooted in control of land.  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the land holdings of Muslim clerics in Xinjiang and of feudal 
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landlords in Tibet were the basis of each region’s social order.  Therefore, with the 
confiscation of land there came severe social disruption and discontent.  This frustration 
with Communist rule grew during the Great Leap and Cultural Revolution as the CCP 
abandoned all policies and pretenses of accommodating the traditional elites in both 
Xinjiang and Tibet.  In each region the dissatisfaction with Beijing eventually led to 
armed conflict between these groups and the Chinese government during this period. 
The strategic situation in the minority territories along China’s borders was also a 
reason behind the PRC’s shift to depluralization and the assimilation of minorities.  As 
discussed, China’s security situation deteriorated throughout the period of the Great Leap 
and the Cultural Revolution to the point were it became militarily engaged with the 
Soviet Union and India on its northern and western borders respectively.  Likewise, the 
presence of U.S. troops in Taiwan and in Vietnam did not improve the PRC’s security in 
the east and south either.  Throughout this period the CCP came to believe that the 
minority groups who lived along the country’s borders were not loyal to the Chinese 
state.  This belief was fueled by the alliance between the Indian and Soviet governments 
with large Tibetan and Uyghur refugee groups who fled China during the Great Leap and 
were openly hostile to Beijing.121  The failure of the CCP’s legitimization strategy in 
minority regions, combined with the growing antagonism between China and its 
neighbors, facilitated the adoption of a depluralization strategy by the Chinese 
government.  The Party hoped to better control minority groups, and consequently their 
territory, by assimilating them into the Han majority.  The goal was to achieve the 
integration of these groups with the Chinese state through cultural uniformity.122 
One final reason for the shift in the PRC’s minority policy was that the CCP had 
become dissatisfied with the pace and scope of change within minority regions.  Despite 
the Party’s efforts to accommodate minorities, they were still largely resistant to 
integration into Communist China.  This had become evident during a brief period of 
openness in China that came to be known as the Hundred Flowers Campaign.  Under this 
campaign the CCP allowed its leadership to be openly criticized, believing that honest 
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feedback would allow the Party to improve itself and gauge China’s progress towards 
socialism.  However, when the tone of the criticism directed at the Party became too 
severe, it immediately clamped down up the Hundred Flowers Campaign and labeled 
those who had spoken out against the Party as dissidents.  These dissidents were then 
removed from society and sent off for ‘re-education.’ 
Through the Hundred Flowers Campaign the CCP discovered the extent to which 
minorities were dissatisfied with Party rule.  Many minorities felt that Beijing had failed 
to follow through on the promises of autonomy made during the early communist period 
and therefore sought to secede from China.123  The expression of this opinion within 
minority areas caused a fundamental shift in the way the CCP dealt with these groups.  
Previously, the Party had believed that through accommodating minority differences and 
providing them with a degree of political, economic, and cultural autonomy it could ease 
resistance to Beijing’s rule and make these groups loyal members of the Chinese state.  
The Hundred Flowers Campaign however, proved this not to be the case, and therefore 
the Party moved away from the legitimization of ethnicity to a depluralization of society 
strategy that entailed comprehensive attempts at assimilation. 
The CCP carried out its plan to assimilate minority groups through a two pronged 
approach that included: an intensification of the methods of control that had been more 
subtly carried out during the early communist period; and through attacks upon the 
cultural diversity of minority groups in order to remove any distinction from the Han 
majority.  Chapter Two discussed the impact of land reclamation and large-scale Han 
migration into minority territories during the early communist period.  Both of these 
practices were stepped up during the time of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural 
Revolution, as minority farmland was increasingly collectivized and state sponsored 
Bintugan Farms continued to grow.  In Tibet collectivization was carried out through the 
creation of Mutual Aid Teams.  The Mutual Aid Teams organized Tibetans into the work 
unit structure discussed above that allowed the state to exert such a high degree of control 
over Chinese society.  They brought labor, land, and production under the jurisdiction of 
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the state and introduced a level of collectivization in Tibet unseen in the early communist 
period.124  The formation of the Mutual Aid Teams was accompanied by the seizures of 
land and property, which was then redistributed in the form of state-owned communes. 
Mutual Aid Teams and larger Agricultural Production Cooperatives (APCs) had 
been created during the early communist period in Xinjiang, but during the time of the 
Great Leap and Cultural Revolution collectivization was expanded to include both the 
herdsman and urban residents of the region.  The creation of pastoral communes forced 
some 2 million herdsmen spread across Xinjiang, Gansu, and Qinghai provinces to 
relocate to specially constructed resettlement villages.125  The purpose of this move was 
both economic and social.  By organizing the herdsmen of Xinjiang in this way the Party 
hoped to divert them and as much of their resources as possible into agriculture, as was 
the purpose of collectivization throughout all of China.  However, through 
communization the Party was able to gain greater control over the group by shifting it 
away from a clan-based organization, further undermining the traditional elites and social 
structure of the Uyghur herdsmen.126  Similarly, in Xinjiang’s urban areas, such as the 
capital Urumachi, the CCP also undertook a comprehensive collectivization campaign.  
By instituting urban communes the Party was able to gain control over the region’s 
intellectual elite, who had made up most of the Eastern Turkistan Republic’s leadership 
prior to 1949.127  These leaders had largely remained loyal to the Soviet Union even after 
the PRC was established and enabled Moscow to continue to exert influence in the region 
despite the rise of the CCP.  The high level of social control granted by communization 
therefore provided Chinese communists with the opportunity to clamp down on Uyghur 
leaders and weaken the Soviet Union’s role in Xinjiang. 
Mutual Aid Teams and Agricultural Production Cooperatives were also 
introduced into Guangxi as part of the CCP's push to communize the country’s entire 
population. Chapter Two discussed the ways in which the CCP created the Zhuang and 
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encouraged many diverse minority groups to combine under that banner, while 
simultaneously taking steps to undercut the autonomy of the very group they were 
creating.  With the onset of the Great Leap Forward the Party shifted its strategy in 
dealing with the people of Guangxi and the ethnic classification of the Zhuang.  During 
the Leap the CCP began to focus on the necessity of economic development over the 
promotion of the Zhuang ethnic identity.128  As such, the people of Guangxi were placed 
into massive communes of up to 10,000 households, regardless of ethnic classification.129  
While the Party did not remove institutions like the Guangxi Nationalities Institute during 
the Great Leap, the de-emphasis of ethnicity in Guangxi along with the communization 
that lumped so many different minorities together economically, politically, and socially 
did a great deal to undercut the Zhuang ethnic identity that the CCP had worked to create 
during the early communist period.130 
As land reform and communization was stepped up throughout China’s minority 
regions as part of the Great Leap, so too was Han migration.  This migration was largely 
state sponsored, carried out by the Production and Construction Corps discussed in 
Chapter Two.131  In Xinjiang, for example, the Han population of the region ballooned 
from a little over six percent in 1953 to nearly forty percent by 1973.132  This period saw 
massive growth of the Xinjiang PCC with the incoming Han migrants taking positions in 
industry, infrastructure improvement, and agriculture.  They helped with the construction 
of rail lines that connected Xinjiang with the rest of China and allowed the CCP to 
penetrate even further into the region.  However, this population explosion in Xinjiang 
only exacerbated the problems with the Great Leap that began to manifest.  Unrealistic 
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production targets led to exaggerated production reports that in turn created even more 
unrealistic targets in a vicious circle that culminated in the massive famine discussed 
above. 
With so many more mouths to feed and the large demographic shift created by 
extensive Han migration into Xinjiang not only deepened the famine there but also gave 
it ethnic connotations.133  To make matters worse, the CCP siphoned off grain from the 
Uyghur areas of the region and shipped it to the Han areas in order to compensate for the 
grain deficit among the Han residents.  This prompted the massive migration of Uyghurs 
and other minority groups from Xinjiang into the Soviet Union.134  As discussed, it was 
the CCP’s attempt to stem this flow of migration into the Soviet Union, that led to the 
violent clash between Uyghur protestors and the PLA in the northern town of Yili.  
Despite these efforts by the CCP however, by late 1962 upwards of 60,000 people had 
fled Xinjiang for the Soviet Union, leaving many counties depopulated and further 
heightening tensions between Moscow and Beijing.135 
Similar problems with famine and unrest occurred in Tibet during this period as 
well.  Throughout 1959 and 1965 there were massive food shortages in Tibet and the 
CCP adopted comparable grain appropriation techniques, where produce was extracted 
from Tibetans via taxes and then redistributed to the Han population of the region.136 
What is interesting to note is that during this period agricultural productivity in Tibet 
actually increased, demonstrating that the food shortages cited above were a result of 
population growth that occurred because Han migration into the region.137  The food 
shortages further intensified the brewing conflict between the Tibetans and the Chinese 
state.  It became one of the points around which the rebels rallied mass support for the 
revolt of 1959.  In addition to contributing to the revolt, the food shortages also produced 
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a large refugee movement from Tibet into neighboring countries.  Between 1959 and 
1965, the height of the food shortage, an estimated 50 to 70 thousand Tibetans fled into 
India, Nepal, and Bhutan.138 
The situation in Guangxi with regards to Han migration was much different from 
what was seen in either Tibet or Xinjiang.  This was due to the close proximity of 
Guangxi to the Han population centers in China’s east as well as the already large 
percentage of Han resident’s in the region.139  The Han and the minorities of Guangxi 
were much more evenly dispersed and therefore intermingled with one another prior to 
the introduction of the CCP’s migration policies.  As such, when the Party undertook 
communization as part of the Great Leap, the Han and minority populations were often 
combined into the same collectives.  This experience was radically different from that of 
Tibet and Xinjiang, where the Han residents were confined to the Bintugan State Farms 
and the subsequent collectivization in those regions primarily effected only the minority 
populations. 
The second prong of the CCP’s approach to assimilate China’s minorities was to 
remove the cultural diversity of these groups in order to eliminate any distinction from 
the Han majority.  They attempted to do this through targeting those elements of minority 
society that were culturally significant and distinct from the Han such as religion, and in a 
related manner, language.  The Party justified this attack on minority culture by asserting 
that minority leaders where simply using religion and language as an excuse to restrict 
socialist reforms.140  In Xinjiang the Party attempted to use language policies in order to 
overcome the position of Islam in the region.  Chapter Two discussed the role Islam 
played in bolstering Uyghur resistance to the Chinese state.  By shifting toward Sufism 
over either Shia or Sunni Islam, the Muslims of Xinjiang were able to maintain their 
religious faith in a way that evaded the state’s attempts at control via land reform.  
During the Great Leap Forward however, the Party changed the official script of 
Xinjiang’s minorities to one using the Latin alphabet and incorporating elements of the 
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Han language.141  In doing this, the CCP intended to undermine the importance of Islam 
and Muslim clerics in Xinjiang by moving the population away from Arabic.  By 
reducing the significance of Islam and its leaders in the region the CCP hoped to remove 
minority religion as a means of resistance to Chinese rule and expedite Xinjiang’s 
political and economic integration into the rest of China. 
Likewise in Tibet, the Party targeted Buddhism as an aspect of regional diversity 
that needed to be eliminated in order to facilitate integration with the Chinese state.  The 
motivation behind this was political, just as in Xinjiang, in that religion was singled out 
as means of gaining increased political control in Tibet.  Given his role as both the 
political and religious leader of Tibet, this made the removal of the Dalai Lama’s 
influence a critical objective of the Chinese state.  As such, Beijing ended its efforts to 
negotiate with the Dalai Lama and officially dismissed him from his duties in the PRC.142  
Additionally, the CCP dismissed the Panchen Lama, who had been formally appointed by 
the Chinese government to lead Tibet in the Dalai Lama’s absence.  With these moves 
Beijing had essentially eliminated the most effective secular and religious Tibetan leaders 
from direct participation in the region’s politics.143  Concurrently, the Party moved to 
reorganize the Tibetan government in a way that excluded religious leaders and other 
traditional elites from local office, formally concentrating political power in the hands of 
Han CCP members.144 
Having undermined Tibet’s political and spiritual leadership, the Party next 
focused on the grassroots organizations of Tibetan Buddhism, the monks and their 
monasteries.  As part of their campaign to destroy the ‘four olds’ (old ideas, old culture, 
old tradition, and old customs), over three thousand Red Guards were sent to Tibet in 
1966.145  Their mission was to overturn the institutions of Tibetan nationalism that had 
prevented the region’s socialist transformation.  Consequently, the Red Guards began 
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destroying Tibetan monasteries and other religious symbols.146  Additionally, the Red 
Guards replaced pictures of the Dalai Lama with those of Mao Zedong, and forced 
Tibetans to study Mao’s writings and teachings on communist philosophy.147  The 
campaign against the four olds in Tibet reached its zenith when the Red Guards issued 
edicts that in essence completely banned the practice of Buddhism and even went as far 
as demand that Tibetans remove all religious material from their homes.148  This 
demonstrates that by the time of the Cultural Revolution the CCP had abandoned all 
pretenses of legitimizing ethnicity and was instead carrying out a whole hearted attempt 
to assimilate Tibet through the destruction of its native culture. 
Due to the close proximity of minority groups and the Han as well as the 
reduction in state support for the Zhuang ethnic identity that occurred during the Great 
Leap and Cultural Revolution, the attacks on minority groups were much more passive in 
Guangxi.  For example, Chapter Two discussed how the CCP created a Zhuang language, 
which it then used as tool to promote the adoption of that identity by the people of 
Guangxi.  However, as part of the effort to end regional diversity and assimilate minority 
groups, the CCP kept Mandarin Chinese the official language.149  As a result of this 
Mandarin remained the language of the media, business, politics, and education.  
Therefore there was no real motivation for the people of Guangxi to learn the Zhuang 
language because it provided no tangible benefits.150  By keeping Mandarin the official 
language the Party was able to curb any desire in Guangxi to truly embrace the Zhuang 
minority identity.  Additionally, interest in minority culture was also deterred by the 
campaign against the ‘four olds’ discussed above.  As part of this campaign the Guangxi 
Nationalities Institute was finally shut down in 1969 and other efforts at the advancement 
and study of minority ethnicity was also halted.151 This demonstrates that the CCP was 
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no longer interested in promoting ethnic diversity and the Zhuang identity and therefore 
those people that the state had so recently classified as the Zhuang during the early 
communist period distanced themselves from that label so as not to become a target of 
the Red Guards. 
As with all of China’s politics during the Cultural Revolution, minority policy 
became heavily radicalized.  This radicalization was basically a codification and 
intensification of the subtle attempts at control carried out during the early communist 
period.  This included the official declaration that China was not a multinational country, 
the designation of minority territories as ‘special’ and ‘autonomous’ were removed, and 
the formal abolition of minority schooling and their languages.152  These policies created 
a situation in which the CCP officials and the Red Guards could treat minority groups in 
anyway they saw fit, regardless of how it might impact their culture or livelihood.  In 
many minority regions the chaos brought on by the poor economic and agricultural 
practices of the Great Leap and the intensity with which the Party and the Red Guards 
attacked their culture caused the resentment of minority groups to lead into violent 
conflict with the state.  Both Xinjiang and Tibet witnessed violent clashes between the 
indigenous populations and the Chinese government that precipitated large refugee 
migration out of China.  Violence also erupted in Guangxi during this period as the 
division and class struggle promoted by the Red Guards grew out of control.  These 
events and the response of minority groups to the state’s actions during this period are the 
topic of the next section. 
D. MINORITY GROUP RESPONSE 
The attempts at assimilation of minority groups carried out by the Chinese state 
during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution provoked a great deal of 
backlash on the part of these groups.  The structuring of the relationship between the state 
and minorities that occurred during the early communist period with the creation of 
ethnically based autonomous regions and promises of political, economic, and cultural 
self-determination took on new significance when the PRC shifted to policies of 
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assimilation.  These promises had been the basis for minority group cooperation with 
Beijing during the early communist period, but as the Chinese government intensified 
collectivization and Han migration during this period it was perceived by minorities as an 
attempt by outsiders to destroy their way of life.153  This prompted increased resentment 
and frustration at Chinese rule that deepened as the CCP increasingly targeted minority 
cultural diversity in order to speed up assimilation into the Han majority.  As a result 
many minority groups during this period engaged in violent conflict with the state. 
Such was the case with both the Tibetans and Uyghurs who became so 
disenchanted with CCP rule that they engaged in violent clashes with the Chinese state.  
The 1959 revolt in Tibet was the culmination of numerous factors that included 
disagreements between Beijing and the Dalai Lama’s government; growing unrest in 
Tibet among both the traditional elite and the masses of the region; and foreign influence.  
The division of historical Tibet among numerous administrative units within the Chinese 
state was one particular point of contention between Lhasa and Beijing.154  In negotiating 
the 17-Point Agreement the government of the Dalai Lama assumed that the tenants of 
the treaty would apply to all Tibetans.155  Therefore, when Beijing divided Tibet between 
the Xizang Tibetan Autonomous Region, Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan and 
applied the 17-Point Agreement only to the autonomous region the government of Lhasa 
vehemently protested.  This move effectively cut off large portions of the Tibetan 
population from the leadership of the Dalai Lama and instead placed them directly under 
the CCP’s provincial governing bodies.  While ultimately there was very little the Dalai 
Lama could do to resist this attempt by the CCP to divide and rule Tibet it become a 
constant source of tension between Lhasa and Beijing. 
Another point of contention between Lhasa and Beijing was the growth of the 
Tibetan resistance movement.  Despite promises from the Dalai Lama of cooperation 
with the Chinese government, neither he nor the CCP had ever been able to quell Tibetan 
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resistance to Chinese rule.156  This resistance movement was largely led by the 
disenfranchised traditional elites of Tibet, the formal feudal landlords, who had lost their 
place in society due to the CCP sponsored collectivization and recruitment of local 
leadership from the peasantry.  These leaders fomented popular resistance among Tibet’s 
masses by highlighting the CCP’s role in the creation of food shortages and attacks on 
Buddhism discussed above.157  The failure of the People’s Assemblies to effectively 
petition the Chinese government for change and the threat of imprisonment if such a 
move was ever repeated left many Tibetans feel they had no choice other than fight given 
the intensity of the CCP’s efforts to assimilate them.158  One final factor in the growth of 
the Tibetan resistance movement was the covert support provided by the United States.  
During this period the CIA provided weapons, supplies, and training to the Tibetan rebels 
as part of plan to harass and distract the Chinese government.159 
Due to these factors the Tibetan resistance had grown to approximately 5,000 
guerilla fighters concentrated in Tibet’s southern territory by 1959.160  Additionally, 
those Tibetans that did not actively fight the Chinese government largely offered their 
support to the resistance, providing shelter, supplies and weapons.161  This led to 
violence in 1959 when the people of Lhasa began to demonstrate against the Chinese 
presence in Tibet, fearing that Beijing intended to kidnap the Dalai Lama.162  The 
resulting violence prompted the Dalai Lama’s departure from Tibet.  The Tibetan 
resistance seized the opportunity to act out against Communist rule, but within several 
weeks the revolt was put down and the local government of Tibet was disbanded.163 
The end of the 1959 revolt and the flight of the Dalai Lama was not however, the 
end of Tibetan resistance during this period.  Following the Dalai Lama’s departure to 
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India, the CCP appointed the Panchen Lama as the official leader of Tibet.  This was 
done because Beijing believed that the Panchen Lama would be more accommodating 
than his predecessor, which would facilitate the integration of Tibet into China.  
However, the Panchen Lama continued to resist Chinese rule much as the Dalai Lama 
had.  The Panchen Lama’s efforts to prevent the total assimilation of Tibet culminated in 
what is known as the 70,000 Character Petition, in which he criticized the CCP for its 
attacks on the Tibetan nationality, specifically those targeted at Tibetan Buddhism.164  
Infuriated by the Panchen Lama’s statements, the CCP dismissed him, dismantled the 
Tibetan government, and officially revoked the promises of autonomy made during the 
early communist period.165  However, from his exile in India the Dalai Lama and the 
large Tibetan émigré community began to undertake a campaign to raise international 
awareness of Tibet’s plight, which would become a hallmark of the resistance movement 
following the Cultural Revolution. 
Similarly in Xinjiang, many Uyghurs responded negatively to CCP rule, violently 
clashing with the Chinese government or fleeing into the Soviet Union.166  As discussed, 
tensions between the CCP and the minorities of Xinjiang became violent in the town of 
Yining in 1962 in a riot between protestors and the PLA.  The immediate cause of the riot 
was Chinese attempts to seal the Sino-Soviet border and prevent further Uyghur 
migration to the Soviet Union.  The deeper cause of the riot was the reason why so many 
Xinjiang’s residents wanted to flee in the first place, these groups had chaffed under the 
Chinese attempts at control.  The collectivization seen in Xinjiang had proved highly 
disruptive to the region’s farmer, herders, intellectuals, and religious leaders.  This 
situation was only made worse by the massive Han migration and corresponding food 
shortages that occurred during this period.  For many Uyghurs the preservation of Islam 
formed the basis of grassroots resistance to Chinese domination.  When the CCP stepped 
up its program to undermine Islam, many Uyghurs then attempted to flee China 
altogether, as demonstrated by the incident in Yili. 
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For Xinjiang’s elite, resistance to Chinese rule proved to be more complicated.  
This was due to the way in which the relationship between these leaders and the CCP 
developed from their association with the Soviet Union.  Many of Xinjiang’s leaders had 
been trained in the Soviet Union during China’s Republican Era.  As such they were 
communist and often times were inducted directly into the Chinese Communist Party 
from the Communists Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).  This was done during the early 
communist period by CCP in order to co-opt Xinjiang’s leadership into the newly 
established PRC’s government structure under the belief that this would facilitate the 
region’s integration into China.  Also during the early communist period the Soviet 
Union decreased the amount of support it provided to these leaders in effort to encourage 
them to cooperate with the CCP.  However, as the rift between Beijing and Moscow 
grew, the Soviet Union began to reassert its influence in Xinjiang.  Fully aware of this the 
CCP undertook the urban communization program discussed above in order to limit 
Moscow’s influence and increase Beijing’s control over the region’s elite. 
In this sense then, Xinjiang’s leadership served two masters, one in Beijing the 
other in Moscow, and by the 1960s the CCP was no longer willing to tolerate this 
arrangement.  As such, this period saw the purge of many influential Uyghur leaders, 
who had risen in Xinjiang’s local government despite their minority status.167  Even 
Saifudin, the prominent Uyghur leader whose association with the CPSU and induction 
into the CCP was discussed in Chapter Two, was unable to escape some persecution by 
the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.  As part of the campaign against the four 
olds in Xinjiang, Saifudin was targeted and his house was ransacked by radical youths.168  
Ultimately, Saifudin survived the purges, but he was one of only a few Uyghurs who 
remained in a prominent position in Xinjiang after the Cultural Revolution. 
In total there were 42,000 Uyghurs removed from public office during the period 
of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, with only Saifudin and one other 
previously politically unknown holding high formal office in the region by 1972.169  The 
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dismissal of so much of the region’s leadership and the radicalism of Cultural Revolution 
politics aggravated the ethnic tension caused by the collectivization campaigns and food 
shortages, resulting in continuous violence and migration in Xinjiang that persisted up 
until the 1970s.170  It was only with the moderation of the policies of the Great Leap and 
Cultural Revolution that Xinjiang began to settle down. 
The small amount of research located for this project on the impact of the Great 
Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution specifically upon the people of Guangxi suggests 
that the experience of the Zhuang during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural 
Revolution was markedly different from that of the Tibetans and Uyghurs.  At a time 
when other minority groups banded more tightly together to defend themselves from 
assimilation by the state, the Zhuang largely abandoned their ethnic identity.  As across 
the rest of China, the people of Guangxi were forced into communes and suffered from 
the subsequent famine that accompanied the failure of the Great Leap.  Throughout this 
period, the institutions created by the state to promote Zhuang awareness were not 
disbanded, but de-emphasized, which reduced the level of state sponsorship provided to 
the Zhuang ethnicity.171  The violence that was seen in Guangxi during this period did 
not necessarily occur across ethnic lines or even with the state, but often between 
neighboring villages with similar ethnic compositions.172  This suggests that conflict in 
Guangxi during this period was more over access to resources, such as food and water, as 
the large sizes of the communes often combined very poor villages with the wealthy.173  
This redistribution of wealth in a time scarcity caused a great deal of resentment, which 
ultimately led to violence. 
E. ASSESSMENT 
The period of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution was perhaps 
the most difficult and tumultuous time in the PRC’s recent history.  International 
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diplomatic and economic isolation, exacerbated by openly hostile relations with the 
super-powers and India, forced Chinese leadership to look inward and attempt to make 
China self-reliant.  The resulting collectivization placed too much of a strain on the 
country’s agricultural system and led to one of the largest famines in history.  The 
instability brought on by the failure of the Great Leap Forward, allowed China to be 
swept up in an outpouring of radicalism that further stunted the country’s development 
and hampered effective governance.  The Cultural Revolution perpetuated the downward 
spiral in China’s economic and political capabilities for almost an entire decade.  It was 
not until Mao himself died, that the damage of the Cultural Revolution could be repaired 
and China could be put on the path towards reform, which will be the topic of the next 
chapter. 
With regards to the Chinese government’s treatment of minorities during this 
period, the extreme changes that took place throughout the rest of Chinese society were 
also reflected in the government’s treatment of minority groups.  This period saw a 
dramatic shift away from legitimization and minority rights to depluralization and 
assimilation.  Additionally, as China’s politics became more radicalized with the failure 
of the Leap and the onset of the Cultural Revolution, so too did Beijing’s minority 
policies.  In order to more rapidly integrate minority areas into the PRC, the CCP 
officially revoked the promises of self-determination, increased collectivization, and 
intensified Han migration.  The change to depluralization was also motivated by CCP 
frustration with the scope of socialist reforms in minority areas as well as the need to 
exert greater control over the strategically important borderlands inhabited by minority 
groups. 
For their part, minority groups during this period responded by organizing 
themselves politically to resist the state, sometimes violently.  This process began 
between 1949 and 1957 when the CCP incorporated ethnicity into China’s political 
system by creating ethnically based administrative units, the autonomous zones, to 
accompany the promises of self-determination.  This facilitated the politicizing of 
ethnicity and created an expectation among minority groups of a certain level of 
autonomy that was not delivered in practice.  Subsequently, when the CCP shifted 
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towards assimilatory policies it further collided with these minority groups as they clung 
more tightly together to defend themselves from the state.  The result was an increase in 
ethnic violence between minority groups and the state during the Great Leap and Cultural 
Revolution.  This is demonstrated by the experiences of both the Tibetans and Uyghurs 
throughout this period as these groups bound more tightly together to resist their 
destruction at the hands of the state. 
For the Zhuang, however, there was not an increase in conflict with the state, and 
to a large extent, the level of ethnic identity among this group actually receded during this 
period.  This was because prior to the Leap and Cultural Revolution the Zhuang existed 
largely as a creation of the state, fueled by CCP propaganda and mobilization campaigns.  
When the CCP changed its stance on minorities groups during this period, the removal of 
government sponsorship caused a drop in the number of people identifying themselves as 
Zhuang.  In short, without the CCP coercing people to be Zhuang, many stopped 
identifying as such and shifted their identity back to the clan/tribe it had been before the 
government introduced the concept of the Zhuang. 
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IV. THE EARLY REFORM PERIOD:  1977-1989 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the end of Cultural Revolution, came the rise of more moderate and reform 
minded leadership in the CCP.  These leaders sought to move away from the radicalism 
of the preceding decades and instead focus upon China’s economic development.  As 
such, they introduced massive economic reforms that brought a great deal of growth to 
China.  However, this growth was not evenly distributed throughout the country, as the 
coastal provinces rapidly developed, the interior lagged further and further behind.  The 
disparity of wealth became a large problem for many of China’s minorities, as they were 
concentrated in west, far away from boomtowns like Shanghai.  For example, during the 
period between 1978 and 1989, China’s per capita GDP more than doubled.174  In 
minority regions however, growth rates had actually dropped to approximately 48 percent 
of the national average over the same period.175  This helped to fuel minority discontent 
with the Chinese state during the early reform period.  In an attempt to more evenly 
distribute the country’s growth and mitigate the subsequent social unrest, Beijing began 
large development projects designed to improve the economic situation of China’s 
minority regions. 
One problem with this development plan however, was that it maintained the 
trend of large scale Han migration into minority regions that had been such a contentious 
issue in earlier periods.  The CCP argued that such relocation was necessary in order to 
complete infrastructure improvement projects, but to many minorities it appeared that the 
state was continuing the assimilatory policies of the Cultural Revolution, only in a more 
subtle form.  The critical difference in the early reform period however, was the 
moderation of China’s politics, which provided these groups with the political space to 
organize and engage with the state in a more pluralistic way.  Under minority law reform 
such groups were awarded a higher degree of participation and freedom of expression 
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that reduced the need for these groups to resort to violence in order to be heard.  As such, 
many minority groups during this period developed effective political organizations so 
that they could participate in government and articulate their demands to the Chinese 
state.  This was demonstrated by the proliferation of pro-minority activist groups, 
institutes, and other organizations during the 1980s. 
The change in the CCP’s approach to minority groups during the early reform 
period meant that many of the demands made by these groups were not only tolerated, 
but often accommodated, as a wave of political liberalization swept the country 
subsequent to the economic reform.  The efforts of the state to legitimize the role of 
ethnicity in politics during this period is reflected in the inclusion of minority rights in 
1982 Constitution and 1984 Law on Regional Autonomy.  These laws provided 
minorities with the broadest and most well defined set of legal protections they had ever 
enjoyed in China.  However, as the 1980s progressed, the push for democratic reforms 
came to threaten the Party’s control of the Chinese state.  In response, the CCP began to 
move away from pluralism and return to the more repressive policies of earlier periods.  
These tensions boiled over in the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, in which state 
security forces violently cracked-down on student protestors.  Following this, the CCP 
halted China’s economic liberalization in order to stabilize the country and reassert its 
rule.  This negatively impacted minority groups, as their political activism became a 
target for state suppression. 
B. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT 
During the late 1960s, the PRC’s international position started to improve as 
Washington and Beijing moved towards rapprochement.  The Nixon Administration 
began to quietly reach out to Beijing, in the hopes that improved relations with China 
would help the United States bring an end to the Vietnam War.176  Additionally, 
President Nixon believed that alignment with China would allow the United States 
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greater leverage over the Soviet Union in negotiations over strategic arms.177  In order to 
accomplish this, Nixon was willing to overlook the radicalism of the Cultural Revolution 
and fundamentally alter the U.S. position on the People’s Republic of China.  The 
greatest of these changes was the shift in Washington’s policy towards Taiwan.  In 
negotiating the rapprochement between the United States and China, both sides agreed 
that there was only one China and that Taiwan was part of that China.178  While there 
was still disagreement over whether Beijing or Taipei was the rightful government of that 
one China, this shift in policy was enough to accommodate leaders in both the United 
States and China, permitting the restoration of diplomatic relations.179  
For Beijing, the diplomatic recognition of Washington and the goodwill of the 
Nixon Administration solved a multitude of strategic and economic problems.  
Domestically, the change in U.S. policy regarding Taiwan was considered a major step 
towards the eventual reunification of the island with the mainland.180  More importantly, 
this change ended the United State’s decades long diplomatic boycott of the PRC, which 
then permitted Beijing to restore its relations with much of the world.  Additionally, by 
repairing its relationship with Washington, Beijing was able to more effectively balance 
and deter Soviet aggression.  This was a major concern given the violent clashes along 
the Ussuri River in 1969 and massive build up of troops on both sides of the Sino-Soviet 
border that had followed.181  So, by achieving rapprochement with the Washington, 
Beijing had made important gains in its objectives regarding Taiwan, removed the threat 
posed by the United States in Vietnam, and made an important ally in its conflict with the 
Soviet Union.  China was now in the position to re-integrate politically and economically 
into the world system. 
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By 1971, the PRC had formally taken possession of the China seat on the United 
Nations Security Council, had negotiated peace with the United States, and was no longer 
internationally isolated.182  All of this fundamentally altered the political and economic 
situation in China that had given rise to the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution.  As such, more moderate members of the CCP were able to rise to power and 
these new leaders then set out to stabilize China politically and remake its economy.  
They began by undoing much of the agricultural collectivization that had been at the 
center of China’s economic problems since the 1950s.  This involved returning the 
responsibility for agriculture back to individual farmers and by 1984 China was growing 
enough grain to feed its entire population.183  This was well received in minority areas, 
where collectivization had been a particularly contentious issue between groups like the 
Uyghurs and the Chinese government.  However, while reforms brought an end to the 
collectivization of minority territory, they did not bring an end to Han migration, which 
continued to be a critical source of conflict between many minorities and the state. 
Another important aspect of the economic reforms was the creation of Township-
Village Enterprises (TVEs) and Special Economic Zones (SEZs).  The TVEs where 
locally owned and operated Chinese factories that were allowed to make a profit off a 
certain percentage of their products.  They often partnered with foreign companies 
enticed to operate within the Chinese economy because of incentives provided as part of 
the SEZs.  The result was tremendous growth in the Chinese economy with the country’s 
GDP more than doubling in the decade between 1978 and 1988.184  One problem 
however, was that much of this growth was confined to China’s coastal regions, where 
the TVEs and SEZs were concentrated.185  This created a large disparity of wealth 
between China’s coast and the interior, which is significant in the discussion of the state’s 
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relationship with minority groups, as these groups reside mostly in the interior.  This 
economic disparity helped to fuel conflict between the state and minority groups during 
this period. 
An unintended consequence of the economic liberalization was subsequent 
attempts at political liberalization.  As China opened its doors to the West economically, 
foreign ideas and popular culture also entered into Chinese society.  Many Chinese 
students became especially impressed by Western democracy, and touted such change as 
a necessary ‘modernization’ for China.186  These ideas challenged the Communist 
ideology of the Party and threatened its leadership of the country.  As a result the Party 
made an effort to suppress such ideas and curb the demand for democratic reform.  
Student unrest over the lack of political liberalization boiled over in a wave of protests 
and demonstrations that began in April 1989.  The students gathered in Beijing’s 
Tiananmen Square, and by May, the number of protesters had grown to over one million 
people.187  Increasingly embarrassed and threatened by the demonstrations, the CCP 
leadership instituted Martial Law on May 20, 1989.  The Communist elders believed that 
the student protestors represented a genuine threat to their power and felt it necessary to 
take decisive forceful action.188  As such, on June 4, they ordered the PLA to clear 
Tiananmen Square by dawn and authorized the shooting of the demonstrators, if 
necessary.189  The PLA did use violence to break up the protests: estimates of those 
killed range from 900 to 3,000 in the approximately eight hours from when the military 
crackdown began to when the square was cleared.190 
The response from the international community to the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre was swift.  The CCP was condemned for its oppressive practices and economic 
sanctions were imposed immediately.191  Once again, China was largely ostracized 
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diplomatically from the rest of the world.  However, with the government having 
demonstrated its willingness to use force to quell dissent, the domestic protests died down 
quickly.192  Communist leaders quickly attempted to return domestic and international 
attention back to China’s economic development.193  This combination of tough domestic 
policy and emphasis upon continued economic growth appeared to work, as by 1992 
China’s economy had recovered from the dip it suffered in response to the Tiananmen 
Square Massacre.194  In this regard the CCP was able to continue its economic 
liberalization without carrying out much in the way of political reform.  The balance 
between reform and retrenchment in the Chinese economy and the need to contain 
popular demands for political liberalization became the focus for the CCP’s domestic 
policy agenda after the incidents of 1989. 
C. MINORITY POLICY DURING THE EARLY REFORM PERIOD 
During the period between 1977 and 1989, the pendulum of Chinese minority 
policy took another dramatic swing back towards a legitimization of ethnicity strategy.  
This change in strategy was undertaken as part of the larger trend away from the extreme 
policies of the Cultural Revolution in an attempt by the CCP to restore political stability 
to China.  Therefore, in returning to a legitimization of ethnicity strategy the CCP hoped 
that it could redeem itself with minority groups who had become embittered with Party 
rule during the previous decades.195  In executing this shift in policy the Party took 
several important steps: the implementation of formal legal protections for minority 
groups; the termination of collectivized agriculture; efforts to economically develop 
minority areas; and a renewed effort to promote minority cultural diversity.  The purpose 
of these moves was to win over China’s minority groups through a more genuine attempt 
at autonomy in order to focus the entire country’s attention on economic development.  
This renewed effort at minority rights went further than what was seen in the early 
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communist period in that the policies were more pluralist and suggested a long-term 
acceptance of the ethnic distinctiveness of minority groups by the Chinese 
government.196 
The attempts at legitimization of ethnicity by the CCP were reflected in the 1982 
PRC Constitution, which provided increased legal protection to minority groups, and the 
1984 Law of Regional Autonomy of the Nationalities.  This law provided minority 
groups with the broadest and most well defined set of legal protections ever seen in 
China.197  These protections included: increased self-administration, definitions and 
obligations of administrative organizations, definition of the relationship between the 
central government and autonomous zone, requirement that the leadership of the 
autonomous zone be from a minority group, and increased responsibility for planning and 
economic development.  The changes embodied in these laws where designed to mitigate 
the supremacy of the CCP in the functioning of the autonomous zones that had restricted 
real self-determination for minority groups in earlier periods.198  By creating more rigid 
legal standards for the protection of minorities, Beijing believed that it could guarantee 
them more equitable treatment and facilitate the peaceful coexistence of these groups 
within the Chinese state. 
Another method by which the Chinese government attempted to improve relations 
with minority groups during this period was through the termination of collectivized 
agriculture combined with increased economic development in minority areas.  As part of 
the overall economic reform undertaken by the Chinese government in the 1970s, 
agricultural collectives were officially disbanded and farmlands returned to individual 
families to work.  This was well received in minority areas where collectivization had 
been a particularly contentious issue.  In addition to controlling agriculture, 
communization allowed the Party to control society, which during the Leap and Cultural 
Revolution they used to dismantle minority culture.  Since minorities had seen 
collectivization as a deliberate attempt to destroy their culture they welcomed the 
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abandonment of this practice.  For example, in Tibet de-collectivization simultaneously 
relieved the regions food shortages and allowed Buddhists to resume their religious 
practices.199 
The de-collectivization in minority agriculture was combined with substantial 
efforts to bring economic development to minority areas.  This was because the CCP 
believed that a primary reason for minority discontent with Chinese rule was due to the 
disparity of wealth between these groups and the Han majority.200  This disparity was not 
only nationwide, but also in minority areas for themselves.  For example, in 1982 
Guangxi was the third most impoverished province in all of China, but also within 
Guangxi itself, the Zhuang were comparatively poorer than their Han neighbors.201  The 
Party recognized that the inequality between the coastal regions where the SEZs were 
located and the interior where the minority groups were concentrated was also fueling 
minority discontent.  In order to balance the growth between the coast and interior, as 
well as improve the economic conditions of minorities, the CCP introduced massive 
development programs in minority areas.202  These included infrastructure projects and 
infusions of capital to facilitate transportation in and out of these regions and encourage 
the development of local industries. 
One final component of the legitimization of ethnicity strategy pursued by the 
Chinese government in the 1980s was to allow, and in some cases promote, ethnic 
diversity among China’s minorities.  This included allowing minorities to freely practice 
their religions and speak their native languages.  The 1982 Constitution included a 
provision to protect religious freedoms despite the Party’s commitment to atheism, 
asserting that as long as the success of China as a country could be put first, minority 
religion would be tolerated.203  As a result, when religious leaders were freed from the 
communes they were allowed to return to work and holy sites throughout China’s 
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minority regions were restored.204  Additionally in Xinjiang, the Chinese government 
permitted Uyghur Muslims to undertake the Islamic Pilgrimage to Mecca.205  CCP cadres 
in Tibet were similarly instructed to avoid interfering in the observance of Buddhism.  As 
such, the work of the Red Guards in Tibet during the Cultural Revolution was quickly 
undone, as Mao’s pictures came down and the Dalai Lama’s went back up in their place, 
with Buddhism resuming its central role in the lives of Tibetans.206 
The Party’s efforts to promote ethnic diversity also included the reintroduction of 
the minority studies institutes that had been founded in the 1950s.  As discussed in 
Chapter Two, these associations were originally created to train minority cadres, 
coordinate minority research, and translate books into minority languages.  Such 
organizations had been shut down during the Cultural Revolution as part of the CCP’s 
efforts at assimilation.  In bringing them back, Beijing hoped to demonstrate its 
acceptance of minority diversity by sponsoring institutions dedicated to the examination 
of and preservation of minority culture.  Therefore, once these institutions were reinstated 
they again began to promote minority history and culture, publishing book and hosting 
regional conferences on minority studies.  With time, these groups took on a political 
aspect, examining ways in which political and economic reform could be better 
facilitated in minority areas.  This was the case in Guangxi, where researchers from the 
Guangxi Zhuang Studies Association undertook an examination of the region’s economic 
development.207  Through such work these groups came to form the center of minority 
activism during the 1980s. 
Despite the legal reforms undertaken by the CCP in an effort to offer minorities 
more genuine autonomy during this period, the legitimization of ethnicity strategy used 
use by the Party was frustrated by many of the same problems that occurred during the 
early communist period.  In ways similar to that seen in the 1950s, the legitimization 
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strategy created political space for minority groups to vent their dissatisfaction at Beijing 
when they felt the Party did not deliver on its promises of self-determination.  This was 
exacerbated by other issues that had persisted into the early reform period, such as, the 
continued monopoly of control enjoyed by the CCP within China’s government structure, 
and the perpetuation of large-scale Han migration into minority regions.  These issues 
produced continued resistance to the PRC, despite the efforts of the Party to be more 
accommodating towards minority groups. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the CCP technically exists separate from the state 
governing structure of PRC.  However, each state organization has a corresponding CCP 
counterpart, which exercises ultimate authority.  As a result of this, the Party can override 
any decision made by the state government including the minority governing bodies in 
the autonomous zones.  So while Communist Party leadership asserted that the 
protections implemented under the 1982 Constitution and 1984 Law on Regional 
Autonomy were sufficient to guarantee minority rights, many groups still felt that their 
autonomy had been undermined by the Han dominated CCP and its role in China’s 
government.208  In Tibet for example, the Party reinstituted the United Front and 
appointed numerous Tibetan cadres to local office.  However, the years of instability in 
Tibet caused by the Cultural Revolution had left the region without an educated 
workforce and therefore a shortage of qualified Tibetan recruits for government posts.209  
Due to this, the Party considered the Tibetan cadres ineffective administrators and 
therefore, the help of the Han was needed in order to keep the regional government 
functioning.210  This excuse prevented any real transfer of power from taking place 
between the Han dominated CCP and the local Tibetan government. 
Additionally, minorities were fearful of the government because of intense effort 
at assimilation made during the Cultural Revolution.  Therefore despite the Party’s 
attempts at reform, minority groups remained leery of the Chinese government, because 
ultimately their fate still rested in the hands of the CCP.  These groups feared that if the 
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Party were to return to the radical policies of the preceding decades, they would once 
again be targeted by the state for assimilation.211  This influenced minority political 
activism during this period, leading many groups to push for political liberalization as 
they believed this was the only a way they could be protected from future attack by the 
Chinese government.  As part of the effort at continued reform, minority groups 
attempted to force the state to better define their rights as laid out in the 1984 law and 
further reinforce that law with more regulation.  During this period, Zhuang political 
activists from the Guangxi Nationalities Research Institute challenged the state to better 
define minority rights with regards to economic self-determination that were promised 
under the Regional Autonomy Law.212  The Party however, obstructed this initiative and 
continued to monopolize economic decision-making in Guangxi throughout the early 
reform years. 
These problems were exacerbated by continued Han migration into minority areas 
throughout the late 1970s and into the 1980s.  Major infrastructure projects undertaken in 
minority territories, like Xinjiang for example, employed primarily Han workers, which 
further encouraged Han migration into these regions.213  As a result, the Han population 
in minority territories continued to grow, reaching 41 percent of Xinjiang’s total 
population by 1982.214  While such infrastructure projects did help to bring economic 
development to minority regions, the employment practices of the Chinese government 
and the ongoing Han migration disproportionately benefited the Han residents of those 
regions.215  As a result of these failures not only did minority provinces remain among 
the poorest in China but also, the minority residents of those areas became even poorer 
relative to their Han neighbors.  For example, during this period most of the Xinjiang’s 
production and subsequent wealth was located in the north and east, where the Han 
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population was concentrated, with per capita GDP reaching between 20000 and 35000 
Yuan.  Meanwhile, in the Uyghur dominated west and south per capita GDP was only 
1245 to 2999 Yuan.216 
A similar pattern was seen in Tibet, where the Chinese government dispatched 
thousands of Han workers to the region to engage in development projects.217  Most of 
these workers were semi-skilled or unskilled and were sent to Tibet originally on short-
term contracts.  However, large numbers of these workers remained in Tibet after their 
contracts expired, taking advantage of the CCP’s preferential hiring policies for the Han.  
The large influx of Han migrants into the region sparked inflation, again making it 
difficult for Tibetans to buy basic commodities.218  This ongoing migration of the Han 
into minority areas and the persistent disparity of wealth between these migrants and the 
indigenous minorities led to continued minority resistance to Chinese rule even after the 
CCP adopted a legitimization of ethnicity strategy. 
D. MINORITY RESPONSE DURING THE EARLY REFORM PERIOD 
The efforts to reform and moderate China’s minority policy undertaken by the 
CCP in the 1980s essentially restored the state/minority relationship to what it had been 
in the early communist period.  Ethnicity once again took on political significance, not as 
the target for assimilation, but rather the criteria for participation.  The CCP hoped that 
through legitimizing ethnicity and incorporating it back into China’s political structure 
the government could win over minority groups and finally bring them into the Chinese 
fold.  This had also been the purpose of the legitimization strategy pursued by the Party 
during the 1950s, but after twenty years of aggressive assimilation, China’s minorities 
were much more cautious in dealing with the state.  This was demonstrated in the growth 
of minority group political activism and the large role those activists played in 
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challenging the state during the early reform period.  Minorities consistently challenged 
the CCP to produce the level of self-determination and economic development it had 
promised under reform. 
The enactment of the 1982 Constitution and 1984 Law on Regional Autonomy 
gave minority group’s a stronger legal base from which to challenge the Chinese 
government during this period than what was seen in earlier times.  As mentioned above, 
the Guangxi Nationalities Research Institute used China’s legal reform as the basis for its 
demands of increased economic self-determination for the Zhuang in the region.  Zhuang 
activists zeroed in on issues of natural resource use, foreign trade, and tax exemptions, 
which they considered too vague in the Regional Autonomy Law and challenged the 
government to more specifically define minority rights in such areas.219  Similarly, in 
Xinjiang scholars from the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences used their position to 
assert Uyghur distinctiveness and criticize the CCP for its attempts to undermine the 
region’s autonomy.220  In this regard, the scholars of Xinjiang in Guangxi became the 
new political entrepreneurs of these regions during this period, using their knowledge of 
the law and academic standing to mobilize resistance to the state.  This was particularly 
acute in Xinjiang where the region’s traditional elite, like Saifudin discussed in Chapter 
Two and Three, had been co-opted by the CCP for so long that they were no longer 
trusted by the Uyghur masses.221  Therefore during the 1980s, Uyghur academics and 
students became a powerful force in mobilizing Xinjiang’s minorities against the Party, 
denouncing Han migration and lack of minority representation in government.222 
Also in Xinjiang, as the restrictions on the practice of religion eased, Islam’s 
popularity resurged.  This led to the reconstruction and reopening of the region’s 
madrasas and mosques, which then became centers for popular resistance to the state and 
challenged the state not only on issues of religious freedom, but also political 
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liberalization, the economy, and migration.223  As such, Islamic traditions became a 
central feature in Uyghur political activism and heavily influenced the nature of their 
demands on the state.224  The economic liberalization that occurred in Xinjiang during 
the 1980s also had important consequences for the revival of Islam in the region.  
Economic reform permitted increased contract between the Uyghurs and Central Asia’s 
other Muslim communities, such as those in Kazakhstan.  This allowed Uyghur activists 
to link their cause to the larger Islamic movement that swept through Central Asia in the 
1980s and 1990s, and brought the Uyghurs an international source of support in their 
resistance to Chinese rule.225 This came not only in the form of political and financial 
aid, but also in terms of military training and weapons, leading to increasingly violent 
Uyghur resistance226 Due to this violence the PRC renewed the prohibitions on Islam in 
the late 1980s, which included ‘monitoring’ Islamic leaders and limiting cross-border 
travel among Xinjiang’s minority communities.227 
Tibet saw a similar revival of Buddhism that after the Party eased the restrictions 
on religion, which prompted the return the region’s traditional elite, the Dalai Lama, to 
Chinese politics.  As part of its political moderation, in 1984 the CCP reopened its 
dialogue with the Dalai Lama in an attempt to negotiate a settlement that would provide 
Tibet with a higher level of autonomy and return the Dalai Lama from his exile in India.  
However, one of the terms that Beijing was not willing to concede was that if the Dalai 
Lama returned to China, he would not be allowed to live in Tibet or hold any office in the 
regional government.  The CCP asserted that this was because there were younger and 
more qualified Tibetans who should be allowed to remain in the region’s leadership 
positions, but the Dalai Lama would instead be appointed to national office, reside in 
Beijing, and be able to visit Tibet as often as he liked.228  The Dalai Lama recognized 
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that this was an attempt by the CCP to limit his authority and therefore refused to return 
to China if he could not reside in Tibet and retain local office.  This stalemate effectively 
brought to an end the attempt at settlement between the Dalai Lama and Beijing. 
The revival of the dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s government and exile and 
the PRC brought the issue into the international arena, which provided the Dalai Lama 
with an opportunity to campaign for the Tibetan cause on the world stage.229  This was 
exactly what he did and as a result in 1987 the US Congress passed a resolution 
condemning the actions of the Chinese government in Tibet.  Along with this, the US 
Congressional leaders invited the Dalai Lama to attend Human Rights Caucus, where he 
used the forum to promote his own peace plan that avoided the contentious issues that 
had halted the Sino-Tibetan dialogue in 1984.230  Shortly after the Dalai Lama’s visit to 
the United States however, the Chinese government executed two Tibetan ‘criminals,’ 
who many Tibetans considered to be political prisoners.  This resulted in mass protests 
and riots in Lhasa that resulted in a government crackdown throughout Tibet.231  Such 
protests and demonstrations were the way in which the Tibetan masses expressed their 
discontent at Chinese rule during this period.  They felt that the PRC had failed to deliver 
on meaningful autonomy and the large influx of Han migrants had produced severe 
inflation and food shortages.  The public executions and the conflict with the Dalai Lama 
caused these tensions to boil over in violent protest among the Tibetan masses. 
E. ASSESSMENT 
The early reform period began with a turn away from the radicalized assimilatory 
policies of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution and a return to the 
legitimization of ethnicity and minority rights.  This shift was part of the larger trend in 
Chinese politics to promote political stability and increase economic development 
throughout the country.  The result was tremendous economic growth, especially along 
China’s eastern coast, which Beijing attempted to export to the interior minority regions 
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through work projects and development aid.  These projects were somewhat successful at 
bringing economic growth to minority regions, but the disparity of wealth between 
China’s coast and interior continued to increase.  Additionally, the CCP’s development 
project spawned massive Han migration into minority areas, giving rise to fears among 
minority groups that the Chinese government had simply shifted to less overt attempts at 
assimilation rather than genuine autonomy. 
Therefore, minority groups organized to defend themselves and make demands on 
the state.  The way in which they did this during the early reform period however, was 
different from what had been seen before. The process that began in the 1950s with the 
creation of ethnically based autonomous zones, and had been interrupted by the violence 
and extremism of the 1960s and 1970s, matured during this period.  By the mid-1980s, 
effective political organization developed among the Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Zhuang, 
with recognizable leadership that articulated a well-defined set of demands to the Chinese 
state.  In this sense, the system finally began to operate as intended.  The Chinese state 
had structured its relationship with these minority groups by including their ethnicity 
within the structures of government.  As such, political movements built up around 
ethnicity and during this period reached maturity, becoming capable of effectively 
interacting with the state. 
This arrangement between minorities and the state was not perfect, as many 
groups felt that the CCP deliberately subverted their autonomy and prevented their 
economic growth.  However, during this period, these groups were able to effectively 
challenge the Chinese government in ways that had not been possible during earlier 
periods, either because the groups themselves were not organized or because of 
repressive state practices.  The challenges levied at the central government by minorities 
were part of a larger push for political liberalization swept through China in the wake of 
economic reform.  The call for democratic reform was to a certain extent permitted, until 
the CCP came to view this movement as a direct threat to its leadership.  These tensions 
erupted in June 1989 with the government crackdown in Tiananmen Square.  Despite 
international condemnation, Beijing turned back towards more repressive government 
policies.  In response, many minority groups engaged in higher levels of ethnic conflict 
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with state, as demonstrated by an increase in violence across minority regions throughout 
the 1990s and into the 21 century. These developments will be discussed in the 
conclusion as part of a discussion on current trends in Chinese minority policy and the 
response of minority groups to the central government in the period after 1989. 
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CONCLUSION 
In March of 2008, riots erupted in the streets of Lhasa as a group of Tibetan 
demonstrators clashed with Chinese security forces on the forty-ninth anniversary of the 
Dalai Lama’s flight to India.  The protests were organized by Tibetan exile groups, 
although not sanctioned by the Dalai Lama himself, in order to call attention to their 
cause in the run up to the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing.232  The protests spread to 
Tibet’s neighboring provinces, which continue to posses considerable Tibetan 
populations, and ultimately somewhere between sixteen and eighty people were killed 
and 170 arrested in order to quell the violence.233  The Chinese crackdown on Tibetan 
protestors brought renewed international criticism for Beijing, including the approval of 
the Feinstein-Smith Resolution in the US Senate, which condemned the violence in Tibet 
and called for talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama.234  Similarly, the Uyghurs have 
increasingly turned to violence in order to express their dissatisfaction with Chinese rule.  
Throughout the 1990s Xinjiang witnessed violent protests and clashes between Uyghur 
separatists and Chinese security forces.  One of the largest occurred in February 1997, in 
the town of Yili when, following a large riot, the government rounded up thousands of 
Uyghurs, convicted them of terrorist acts, and sentenced many to death.235 
The escalation of ethnic conflict between the Chinese state and minority groups in 
the post-Tiananmen period has occurred despite an apparent continuation of the 
legitimization strategy used by the CCP in the 1980s.  It could be argued that this is due 
to a shift back to more repressive practices by the Party even though it still technically 
subscribes to a policy of ethnic inclusion in China’s politics.236  The PRC’s minority 
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policy remains legitimization in name because the minority rights enumerated in the 1982 
Constitution and 1984 Law on Regional Autonomy remain in place.  As such, China’s 
minorities continue to have a legal basis from which to challenge the state to deliver on 
its promises of self-determination.  However, at the same time, the Party has stepped up 
its methods of control in minority areas.  For example, the Party used its position as the 
ultimate authority in China’s government to enact a criminal law in 1997 that makes it 
unlawful to use ethnic and religious problems to attack to the state.237  Subsequently, the 
CCP has suppressed dissent by arresting and prosecuting minority activists under this 
law.238  The Party has also continued to promote Han migration into minority territories 
as part of its economic development program.  By 2000 the Han had come to account for 
forty three percent of Xinjiang’s total population, up from just five percent in 1949.239 
This disparity between China’s official minority policy and what has been 
observed in practice complicates the application of the institutional framework to the 
post-1989 period.  On the one hand, the legal protections granted to minorities during the 
1980s remain firmly in place, implying that the intention of the Chinese government is to 
continue its strategy of legitimizing ethnicity.  On the other hand, it appears that the CCP 
has begun to use more repressive tactics to suppress minority discontent, which is 
reminiscent of the government’s policy during the Cultural Revolution.  This 
contradiction makes it difficult to deduce the intent of any conflict management strategy 
in use by the Chinese government in the post-1989 period.  This in turn complicates any 
attempt to measure the effectiveness of the CCP’s efforts to mitigate ethnic conflict and 
compare it with the predictions of the institutional framework as was done in the earlier 
periods. Therefore, this study will not draw any conclusions about the post-1989 period 
other than to point out the apparent escalation of China’s ethnic conflict throughout the 
1990s and into the 21 century as discussed above. Ultimately, further research into the 
 
 
                                                 
237 Dreyer, China’s Political System, 296. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 307. 
 83
relationship between minority groups and the Chinese government during the time 
following the violence at Tiananmen Square is required before an institutional assessment 
as conducted in this study via the four-step process can be completed. 
In Guangxi however, there has not been an increase in violence between the 
Zhuang and the Chinese state.  There are two possible reasons for this; one is that the 
created nature of the Zhuang ethnic identity has never really taken a strong enough hold 
among the people of Guangxi for them to mobilize around it to resist the state.240  
Another is that the central government’s economic development plan proved to be highly 
successful in Guangxi throughout the 1990s and into the 21 century.  For example, by 
2000 Guangxi had achieved a level of development consistent with most of the rest of 
China, with only the economic boom towns like Shanghai, Beijing, and Tainjin had 
higher levels of development.241  This brought benefits like an increased standard of 
living and better healthcare to the people of Guangxi, perhaps removing any desire 
among the Zhuang to resist the Chinese state.  It is likely that it is a combination of both 
of these factors that have produced a reduction in ethnic conflict between the Chinese 
government and the Zhuang in the post-1989 period. 
What this thesis has attempted to demonstrate the importance of the institutions 
employed by the Chinese government in influencing the scope and nature of ethnic 
conflict within China.  This was done through a four-step process used to break down and 
evaluate the role played by government institutions in influencing the development of 
ethnic conflict.  The first step of this process involved an examination of the Chinese 
government’s intent with regards to the country’s minority population during each period. 
The second step involved an assessment of how the CCP attempted to achieve its 
objectives.  Thirdly, the analysis focused on the response of minority groups to the 
actions taken by the state in each period.  Finally, an assessment was made of whether or 
not the minority response was what Chinese leaders had intended.  This included a 
comparison between the actual minority response, the government’s intended outcome, 
and the outcome predicted by the institutional theorists described above. 
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This evaluation revealed the following with regards to the different ethnic conflict 
management strategies employed by Beijing.  One, in both the early communist and early 
reform periods, the CCP wanted to achieve the peaceful submission of minority groups to 
Chinese rule.  It therefore adopted a legitimization of ethnicity strategy that promised 
minority groups a degree of political, economic, and cultural self-determination.  In each 
period however, this \ strategy was poorly implemented, as the CCP used its authority 
within the Chinese political system to largely subvert minority autonomy.  In response, 
minority groups rallied around their ethnicity and used this as the basis for their demands 
on the state.  This was made possible by CCP’s actions, as in adopting a legitimization 
strategy in the first place the Party made ethnicity a relevant part of the political process.  
Once the relationship between the state and minority groups becomes defined in terms of 
ethnicity in this way, these groups become more likely to engage in ethnic conflict with 
the state.  So rather than produce peaceful submission as the Party had intended, the 
legitimization strategy led to resistance to Chinese rule in both the early communist and 
early reform period.  This outcome however, does align with the predictions made under 
an institutional theory of ethnic conflict. 
Two, during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, the CCP shifted its 
minority policy to depluralization of society via assimilation. This shift was undertaken 
in order to remove minority distinctiveness as an obstacle to the Party’s control over 
Chinese society and territory.  The CCP attempted to do this through aggressive attacks 
on minority culture, religion, and way of life.  In response however, minority groups 
largely intensified their resistance to Chinese rule during this period.  The time of the 
Great Leap and Cultural Revolution in China was filled with examples of violence 
between the state and minority groups.  In Tibet and Xinjiang there was revolt and 
exodus, but this type of resistance was not seen in Guangxi.  This contradiction between 
the response of the Zhuang and the other minority groups is discussed below.  The overall 
intensification of resistance to Chinese rule was not what the CCP had intended.  
However, this exact response from minority groups is forecasted under the institutional 
theory of ethnic conflict.  Institutional theorists assert that when minorities are targeted 
by the state in the manner seen during this period, they will cling more tightly together in 
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order to avoid their destruction.  The response of China’s minorities between 1958 and 
1976 again validates the application of the institutional theory to the Chinese case. 
Third, in the comparison between the responses of three specific minority groups 
reveals some limitations of the institutional approach to ethnic conflict.  Throughout the 
different time periods both the Tibetans and the Uyghurs responded to the state’s actions 
consistently in the way described under the institutional framework.  When ethnicity was 
legitimized, these groups mobilized in response to perceived inequalities and resisted the 
Chinese state.  When Beijing attempted to aggressively assimilate these groups, they only 
intensified their resistance and often resorted violence in order to avoid destruction.  
During periods of legitimization the Zhuang also responded by mobilizing to place 
demands for autonomy and self-determination on the state.  However, when the PRC 
shifted to assimilatory and repressive practices during the Cultural Revolution and again 
following Tiananmen Square, the Zhuang largely receded and engaged in less conflict 
with the state.  This demonstrates that during periods of increased repression, the Zhuang 
responded exactly in the way the Chinese government intended, by retreating from their 
ethnicity and placing fewer demands on the state.  So, while the application of the 
institutional approach to the experiences of the Tibetans and Uyghurs proved accurate, 
such was not the case in terms of the Zhuang.  This indicates that in certain cases the 
institutional framework must be augmented or an alternative explanation must be found 
in order to understand the causes of a particular ethnic conflict. 
With regards to the debate concerning the Zhuang’s minority status, this study 
seems to refute the assertion that the Zhuang behave in ways similar to other minority 
groups because they have developed a distinct ethnic minority.  Instead, the data suggests 
that the people of Guangxi have embraced the Zhuang ethnic identity when it has 
benefited them to do so, and rejected that identity when it has become too costly.  This 
flexibility indicates that the Zhuang ethnic identity is much more instrumental than it may 
appear on the surface, as the people of Guangxi are able to shift their ethnic identity away 
from the Zhuang classification when it becomes disadvantageous in ways that the 
Tibetans and Uyghurs cannot. 
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This evaluation of the importance of institutions in the development of China’s 
ethnic conflict ultimately yields two conclusions.  First is that overall, those institutions 
employed by the Chinese government between 1949 and the present have not been 
completely effective in mitigating ethnic conflict within China.  Throughout the entire 
period both the Tibetans and Uyghurs engaged in some level of conflict with the state, 
along with additionally resistance from the Zhuang in the 1950s and 1980s.  Second is 
that, with the exception of the Zhuang during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural 
Revolution, the institutional approach accurately described the development of ethnic 
conflict within China.  This is significant because it lends validity to the application of 
the institutional approach to the study of other ethnic conflicts as well.  Additionally, this 
assessment of the institutional causes of ethnic conflict in China has the potential to 
inform future attempts to improve the institution that form the foundation of the 
relationship between the Chinese government and its minorities.  It is possible that such 
work could result in the creation of new, or the improvement of, existing institutions in 
China in order to better mitigate ethnic conflict. 
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